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1
Introduction and Overview
Morris M. Kleiner
University of Minnesota

Grease in the gears of intricate machinery can make it operate more
effectively, but grit in the gears will slow it down, and could dramatically reduce its efficiency. Analogously, government intervention in
the operation of labor markets may make them operate more effectively—like grease—or may slow its workings—like grit (Groshen and
Schweitzer 1999). In this book we examine for the first time in a comprehensive manner a dominant governmental institution in the labor
market—occupational licensing—to evaluate the extent to which these
regulations enhance or diminish the efficient workings of labor and service markets in the United States and parts of Europe (Kleiner 2006;
Koumenta and Pagliero 2019). Occupational licensing is often referred
to as “the right to practice.” Under licensing laws, working for pay in
a licensed occupation is illegal without first meeting government standards. Certification, another form of government regulation, provides a
“right to title,” which does not forbid others from providing the service
but it prohibits the use of a specific title for working in the occupation.
This book examines occupational regulation from an international
perspective across five countries and multiple services and occupations
(Kleiner 2013). Our aim to provide both breadth and depth to the issues
of the potential costs and benefits of service quality and efficiency in
regulated service occupations.
The licensing of occupations is usually based on the protection of
the public interest and service quality to society. It is rare, however, that
such criteria are subjected to theoretical or empirical scrutiny. Existing literature on occupational regulation (Farronato et al. 2020; Kleiner
et al. 2016) has documented the difficulty in developing measures of
service quality. The ability to evaluate the influence of occupational
licensing on quality outcomes has been difficult to assess for at least
three reasons. First, quality is challenging to define and measure. For
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example, it is common to use consumer satisfaction to assess quality
in the market, but solely relying on consumer satisfaction might provide insufficient information on the licensing-quality relationship. Second, the criteria of what constitutes good quality service varies greatly.
Measures of quality usually depend on the occupation in question,
thereby limiting the degree to which researchers can generalize from
occupation-specific studies to the universe of occupations that are regulated. Consequently, it makes sense to focus on specific occupations.
Third, limited data availability places significant constraints on what
research questions we can address empirically, thereby compromising
the scope for evidence-based evaluations. For example, prices, health,
and education outcomes are often difficult measures to obtain from
existing governmental and industry sources in Europe and the United
States.
Some of the challenges to evaluating occupational licensing outcomes are related to methodology. There may be nonrandom and unobservable factors that confound attempts to identify the causal effect of
occupational regulation on quality in empirical work. Studies from the
United States often exploit between-state variations in licensing regimes,
which enables researchers to undertake comparisons of the same occupation while controlling for other explanations of the observed effects.
In the case of the European nations, these cross-national variations are
more difficult to obtain.
In this book we evaluate and clarify the relationship between licensing and quality by using expanded definitions of quality. For example,
the authors develop methods associated with effectiveness, consistency,
nonexcludability, and affordability in service delivery. They operationalize these approaches by using a variety of measures associated with
(a) the processes involved in service provision, (b) the outcomes of the
services provided, and (c) other value-added proxies. They draw on
regulatory changes and outcomes within occupations in Europe and the
United States to empirically assess the effect of regulation on quality
and illustrate different policy evaluation approaches.
Overall, this book seeks to answer the following empirical question:
What is the relationship between occupational regulation and service
quality? We use empirical case studies within and across nations and
occupations to compare homogeneous groupings of workers and consumers within similar institutional frameworks. We take three unique
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approaches in this volume to understand the national and data innovations. First, we provide a variety of methods because there is more than
one way to address this question. Taken together, our case studies make
use of extensive empirical methods and data sources, all showing the
complexities associated with defining the measures of quality. Second,
owing to the unique nature of each occupation in the labor market and
the high heterogeneity in how quality can be defined and measured,
our approaches are good illustrative examples of how such important
research questions can be tackled. We do not offer a one-size-fits-all
solution to addressing these important policy dilemmas. Instead, our
goal is to draw attention to the challenges associated with undertaking
research of this kind, while at the same time empirically illustrate ways
in which these challenges and policy proposals can be addressed. Third,
we avoid thinking of occupational regulation as a binary state, which
not only captures observationally more common policy initiatives but
also imposes unnecessary and possibly socially suboptimal restrictions
on policy alternatives, such as the relaxation or tightening of regulatory
provisions. Including diverse forms of regulatory initiatives across continents will shed new light on the types of reforms that could be evaluated and implemented under different institutional frameworks.

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATION
Occupational licensing policies are a major source of labor market
regulation in the United States and Europe, which has potential costs—
licensing may reduce the supply of labor in licensed occupations and
drive up prices—and benefits—better product quality because of higher
levels of job-specific education and training. Despite the often-heated
debate over the trade-offs posed by licensing, economists and policy
analysts have offered little guidance on how to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of such policies within different nations and across occupations.
The underlying rationale for the influence of occupational licensing
is that it affects both labor supply and demand for the services. Licensing influences supply by increasing the costs of entry and thus reducing
the number of persons in the occupation. Hours worked, however, may
increase as wages rise. The supply of workers in the case of occupa-
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tional licensing can only increase by the number of individuals who
go through the process to receive their license. The assumption is that
government is influenced by the occupational organizations representing the workers in the trade, ranging from doctors to interior designers.
In contrast to the supply issues above, occupational licensing
increases the demand for labor, since consumers perceive that the regulated services are of higher quality because of the increased job-specific
training. The total supply of services to consumers is a function of the
offsetting effects of falling labor supply and rising demand for the regulated service. Also determinative is whether consumers are willing to
pay more for them. This volume attempts to address these issues.

PREVIEW OF THE STUDIES
The six case studies presented in this book delve into different areas
of the influence of occupational licensing and measures of quality. The
first four chapters break new ground by examining occupations practiced in European nations. Similarly, the last two chapters evaluate the
influence of licensing on quality in health care and in beauty services
for the United States. Below we preview the chapters and discuss how
they contribute to the overall theme of whether regulations provide
grease or grit in the quality consumers receive from particular services.
The first case study, by Morris M. Kleiner, examines how variations
in the regulatory requirements imposed on the ridesharing firm Uber
affect measures of quality outcomes for two cities, London and Dublin.
Kleiner uses pricing, customer satisfaction, and safety, as measured by
hard accelerations and hard braking. Kleiner’s research finds little evidence that greater regulatory constraints (at least of the type observed
in these two jurisdictions) improve ridesharing experiences or reduce
prices for passengers. Further, the technological context within which
the taxi and ridesharing driving professions operate is considerably different than was the case when the regulatory provisions for taxi drivers
were initially instituted. Based on the evidence for this firm, a reassessment of the form that regulating entry to the taxi and ridesharing driving
professions is undertaken may be in order. Further, occupations that
have innovative technology can reduce information asymmetries, as is
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the case for London and Dublin. Consequently, reducing regulations
may be an appropriate path for policymakers to take in considering
regulatory labor policies in the face of new technologies.
Chapter 3, by Maria Koumenta and Mark Williams, examines a
unique issue of entry into the profession of driving instructors in the
United Kingdom (U.K.). Driving instructors are subject to compulsory
training requirements, which in practice has led to a dual market where
fully trained (licensed) and trainee (in the process of completing their
training and obtaining a license) driving instructors could both legally
offer instruction for payment. The government changed the requirements by trainee license holders since so few went on to become full
instructors. As a result, they could no longer provide driving lessons
for money unless they were accompanied by a fully licensed driving
instructor, marking a shift from certification to de facto licensing.
Koumenta and Williams do not observe any increases in the pass
rates of student drivers, leading them to conclude that the quality of
driving instructors has not improved. Similarly, they do not find any
improvement in three quality measures of consumer performance. For
example, overall pass rates are negative once time trends are considered. These findings are reinforced when they compare the trends in
pass rates for student drivers to those of motorcyclists before and after
the reform proposals. Finally, they note an increase in the cost of driving lessons. The authors conclude that the introduction of licensing for
U.K. driving instructors has not resulted in any improvement in service
quality, and they discuss the implications for regulation policy.
In Chapter 4, Eva Pagano, Mario Pagliero, Emanuele Pivetta, and
Lorenzo Richiardi examine the regulation of pharmacies in Italy and
population health outcomes. In Italy, the work of pharmacists, the
number and location of pharmacies, and the production, trade, and distribution of drugs are all heavily regulated. For example, the number
of pharmacies and their locations are determined through administrative procedures. The authors use hospital admission record data at the
municipality level, exploiting the change in the demographic rule that
links the number of pharmacies to the number of inhabitants in the
municipality. Pagano et al. find a significant effect of the availability of
pharmacies on selected health outcomes, but the results show a negative
impact of availability of pharmacies on the number of hospital admissions related to influenza.
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Chapter 5, by Piotr Białowolski and Michał Masior, examines the
deregulation of the legal professions in Poland. In 2004 and 2005, a
set of activities reserved exclusively for those in the legal profession
were relaxed, and in 2005 and 2009, entry restrictions and experience
requirements, as well as passing scores for bar exam for lawyers, were
reduced. Owing to the easing of entry into the legal profession, the number of advocates and legal advisors doubled between 2005 and 2015.
Białowolski and Masior evaluate these changes through the lens of service quality. They also examine the number of reported complaints and
disciplinary cases. The authors’ analysis of complaints by the type of
reported misconduct indicates that the frequency of the most common
allegation, a breach of professional duties, fell by two-thirds following the reforms and opening of the profession to newcomers, while the
frequencies of other types of reported breaches, including unethical
behavior, remained stable or slightly declined. Overall, the relaxation
of licensing for legal services greatly benefited the consumers of legal
services.
The last two case studies focus on evaluations of the quality aspects
of the influence of licensing for specific occupations in the United
States. Kihwan Bae and Edward Timmons in Chapter 6 study the effects
of expanding scope of practice for health service professionals on the
quality of care received by patients. They review the existing literature
and focus on advanced practice registered nurses—nurse practitioners
and other nurse subspecialties. Although the literature has some limitations, there is an emerging consensus: allowing medical practitioners
the ability to work independently from physicians does not reduce the
quality of care. Bae and Timmons examine geographic and occupational correlations of scope of practice on health outcomes. If anything,
the increase in independent practice appears to improve the quality of
care with no measurable influence on prices. Despite these results, regulatory reforms on the scope of practice are often crippled by professional associations and their members who may benefit from existing
regulations. They conclude by stating that the COVID-19 pandemic
has provided both researchers and policymakers with an opportunity to
further consider and investigate the implications of these health policy
questions.
In Chapter 7, Darwyyn Deyo examines the effect of licensing on
quality for two occupations related to beauty services: makeup artists
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and shampooers. These occupations are not licensed in every state, and
the policy variation allows the author to study the effect of having stringent licensing requirements, such as the amount of licensing fees or
board licensing exams, and the influence of having a license. The analysis examines businesses in licensed occupations (makeup artists and
shampooers) with the ratings for an unlicensed occupation (pet groomers). Deyo finds that licensing requirements and the associated intensity do not significantly increase quality through the ratings measure of
consumer satisfaction. She also finds evidence that licensing sometimes
has a negative effect on quality—this result is clearer when businesses
are separated by the number of reviews each one received. Licensing
does not seem to measurably increase quality across the board or for
all businesses, even within the same occupation. Under another set of
estimates, licensing barriers reduce quality while also imposing entry
barriers for workers and higher costs for consumers. The net effect is
that licensing does not seem to reliably increase quality, as measured
by consumer ratings. Deyo suggests that policy reform that reduces
licensing barriers does not have to come at the cost of lower quality for
consumers.

DIRECTION FOR THE VOLUME
Although each case study in this book examines the effect of licensing on efficiency and service quality, there is also a focus on labor market issues. First, occupational licensing has been found to raise wages
only for licensed workers, reduce occupational and geographic mobility, and lower employment. Second, are there sufficient efficiency and
service quality gains through these regulations to consumers to compensate society for these inefficiencies and barriers in the labor market
(Kleiner 2015)? The goal of this book is to give the public, consumers, and students of the economy and labor market a detailed, nontechnical look at occupational licensing in Europe and the United States.
The book examines the institution of occupational licensing from an
international perspective, offers a view from the perceptions of consumers, and outlines some unintended consequences of policies that
have arisen because of occupational licensing. The reader of this book
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should become a more informed member of a regulated occupation,
consumer, student of regulation, or voter who can better determine
the direction of policy that will help to evaluate whether occupational
licensing serves as grease or grit in the operation of labor markets and
service economies.
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2
Occupational Licensing Outcomes
in the Face of Technological Change
Ridesharing in London and Dublin
Morris M. Kleiner
University of Minnesota

Two rapidly growing trends in the labor market are the expansion
of occupational regulations imposed by the government and the growth
of the on-demand or contingent workforce (Katz and Krueger 2016;
Kleiner and Krueger 2010, 2013). The taxi industry and its drivers historically have been heavily regulated by governments in most developed countries. These regulations typically involve granting exclusive
rights to provide cab services to firms and setting standards for its drivers. Usually, the services include quality controls (such as vehicle age
and appearance), the imposition of entry restrictions for drivers (such as
topographical knowledge tests), and the control of fares (Beesley 1973).
The justification for these licenses has been public safety and consumer
protections. From an occupational licensing perspective, the most common barrier to entry for individuals looking for work in the sector is
the requirement that drivers be licensed by local governments. Ideally,
a study seeking to address these questions would examine indicators of
service quality before and after the removal of entry requirements to
the occupation. However, since such deregulatory shocks are rare, an
alternative approach is to focus on the differences in entry requirements
for prospective drivers across jurisdictions. The recent increase in the
number of ridesharing services, which compete with traditional taxi
services, offers an opportunity to examine how differences in regulation
affect quality outcomes.
Ridesharing services refer to rides provided by drivers for remuneration by passengers who order and pay for this service via a smartphone app, and these contractors are among the fastest growing markets
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of on-demand workers (Katz and Krueger 2019). Drivers use their own
private vehicles, set their own hours, and in most jurisdictions have
been considered private contractors who link onto the app.
This chapter uses data from Uber Technologies to examine how
differences in regulations to become a ridesharing driver affect quality outcomes in London and Dublin. A key question is whether more
relaxed regulation requirements to become a driver are associated
with inferior services or quality. As the restrictiveness of the regulatory regime increases, does quality improve enough to justify this
potentially costly regulatory intervention? How does the variation in
regulations on ridesharing affect consumer satisfaction and measures
of ride safety? The analysis shows how fares vary with the intensity
of licensing requirements and compares the quality of rides in London, where entry to the occupation is more relaxed relative to heavily
regulated “fully licensed” taxi drivers, and Dublin, where ridesharing
drivers are subject to the same stringent requirements as those of “fully
licensed” taxi drivers (Kleiner 2006).1 The results of ridesharing in
London and Dublin are measures of consumer satisfaction of a ride on
a scale of one through five. Measures of vehicle hard starts and hard
stops are measured in both percent and the number of hard starts per
ride. Finally, prices are in dollars per standardized ride in both cities.
Specifically, I use data from Uber Technologies to measure the influence of more relaxed regulations on consumer satisfaction with the
service, measures of safety of the vehicle, and prices of rides. These
outcomes should provide new evidence on how regulation affects service for ridesharing when there are major technological changes within
an occupation.

OVERVIEW OF THE RIDESHARING INDUSTRY
Ridesharing became popular in 2010, as the use of smartphones
became widespread, but there is limited research on the outcomes of
these services. Most countries regulate the taxi industry by setting entry
restrictions for drivers, operators, pick-up procedures, and vehicles
(Schaller 2007). The theoretical rationale for taxi regulation is developed from the experience good problem: goods for which quality cannot
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be determined by the consumer until after the good has been consumed,
giving rise to “moral hazard” (e.g., the provider overcharging, operating a substandard car, or taking a longer route, all because there are few
consequences of providing lower-quality services). Regulation in the
form of minimum standards setting is assumed to solve this imperfect
information problem (Shleifer 2010). Proponents argue that regulation
is vital to ensure customers do not experience longer trips and higher
fares by using unscrupulous providers or have their safety compromised
by dangerous driving or criminal behavior. Further, while they accept
that price and supply controls might result in higher fares, this enables
dense markets to cross-subsidize low-density ones while peak traffic
cross-subsidizes off-peak service availability (Dempsey 1996). Without regulation, service to low-density and off-peak trips may decline or
be unavailable. Critics of this approach argue that unregulated market
entry and fares for taxi providers will shift the supply curve upward,
resulting in lower fares, shorter waiting times, improved availability
(especially in underserved markets), and greater entrepreneurial opportunities (especially for minorities and immigrants) (Cevero 1985).
From an empirical perspective, research has looked at the effect of
regulatory changes on service availability and prices as they apply to
the taxi service market in general and from a producer perspective. The
removal of quantity controls on taxis in many U.S. cities, for example,
caused supply to increase by an average of 19–23 percent (Dempsey
1996; Schaller 2007; Teal and Berglund 1987). Dempsey (1996) finds
that in cities that abolished quantity and fare restrictions, prices in both
cruising and dispatch markets rose by an average of 29 percent per year,
but despite a slight initial surge in supply, service availability fell to prederegulation levels. More recent work by Rojeck and Masior (2016)
analyzes the deregulation of entry to the taxi driver occupation in Poland
that took effect in 2013. The reform included giving authorities the right
to control pricing practices, as well as dropping the requirement of a
preparatory course and exam in cities with populations over 100,000.
This provided an ideal context for which to compare the effects of the
reform between cities, but also before and after reform comparisons
of the regulations relative to prices. The study finds that in those cities
where barriers to entry were relaxed, prices after the reform fell for the
first time, while the supply of taxis rose as measured by the number of
licenses issued. Using quality indicators such as license withdrawals,
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complaints filed against taxi drivers, and frequency of malpractice, the
authors find mixed results on quality.
In contrast to these previous studies, this chapter analyzes the regulation of drivers. In practice, entry to the occupations in different jurisdictions is covered by a wide spectrum of regulatory policies, and it is
this variation in restrictiveness that is the focus of the chapter, specifically the levels of regulation rather than the existence of licensing.
Background on the Company and Cities Examined
Uber Technologies is headquartered in San Francisco, with operations in 633 cities worldwide. Its platforms can be accessed via its websites and mobile apps. Uber began its rides in San Francisco in 2010
and in New York City the following year. The technology company’s
business model was to match people needing rides with people who
were willing to provide those rides for a price. Uber expanded outside
the United States in 2013, and London became one of its largest and
most successful operations, with about 40,000 drivers and more than
3.5 million customers. At different times the firm has had up to 80 percent of the total ridesharing market in London, the U.K., and the United
States; the Dublin estimates have been harder to obtain (DMR Statistics
2017; Financial Times 2017). However, those numbers on market share
have declined recently as more competitive substitutes have entered the
ridesharing market.
The creation of an app and accompanying software facilitated the
company’s matching process and allowed valuable data to be collected
that can compare indicators of quality for different levels of stringency
in entry requirements for taxi drivers. The drivers pay a fee—a percentage of the ride—to Uber for using the matching process (Hall et
al. 2019). Under this business model, ridesharing drivers pay a portion
of their fares to the ridesharing platform operator (in this case Uber),
a commission-based compensation model used by many internetmediated service providers. To Uber drivers, this commission is known
as the Uber fee. By contrast, traditional taxi drivers in most cities make
a fixed payment independent of their earnings, usually a weekly or daily
medallion lease, but keep the fare dollar net of expenses.
London and Dublin have both similarities and differences in how
taxi and ridesharing services operate. For some historical background,
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London’s taxi service market has traditionally been served by two types
of providers, namely the “black cab/hackney” drivers and “minicab”
drivers. Black cab drivers have traditionally had a legal monopoly
through taxi regulations to be the only service that can be called on the
street through hailing a taxi or from a cab phone. In contrast, minicabs
must be prebooked and are not allowed to be fitted with a taxi meter.
The prebooking takes place via taxi service companies.
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Uber was one of the most popular ways to book rides in London. At that point the city accounted for
about 5 percent of Uber’s global active user base of 65 million, and
nearly a third of its active user base of 11 million in Europe. There were
about 40,000 licensed Uber drivers in London who serviced about 3.5
million users. There is fierce opposition to Uber from the Licensed Taxi
Drivers’ Association, a union representing London’s black cab drivers, whose drivers take several years to train for their job, in part by
memorizing London’s streets, a practice called the Knowledge. In contrast, the governmental entry requirements that exist for Uber drivers in
London are the same as those that apply to the minicab drivers. These
lower requirements have made entry into the ridesharing business as a
supplier of these services much easier than traditional black cabs. Uber
drivers use technology through the app in the car to find locations in
London. The relatively high cost of training for drivers using the fully
licensed black cab model has helped make Uber popular among prospective drivers in London. A four-mile trip in the middle of the week
costs at least $24.00 in a black cab compared to about $11.00 with Uber
(Wall Street Journal 2017). Uber was under threat of losing its license
to operate in London but held on despite opposition by black cab operators (Satariano 2018). In 2021, Uber contractors came under U.K. labor
laws with substantially greater wages and hours benefits (Satariano
2021).
Similarly, Dublin is also a capital city and is the largest city in Ireland. It is, however, much smaller than London, with a population of
almost 2 million. The taxi sector in Ireland has traditionally been highly
regulated, involving firm restrictions on the number of new vehicle
licenses (i.e., licenses linked to the vehicle, not the driver) issued by the
state (Barrett 2003). As the industry regulator, the National Transport
Authority also has the power to control the number of licensed taxi
drivers by setting the pass rate, exam fees, and other licensing require-
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ments. Ireland’s rapid economic growth in the 1990s and a booming
tourist market increased demand for taxi services, but because of caps
on the number of vehicle licenses that the state regulators were issuing,
it resulted in increased customer discontent with the sector and its regulators (Barrett 2010). In 2000, the Irish High Court increased the size of
the taxi sector by gradually raising the cap on vehicle licenses.
Uber’s method of operation is different in Dublin. Irish law requires
that anyone carrying passengers for pay must have a full taxi license.
Consequently, Irish regulatory policy requires Uber drivers in Dublin to
meet the same requirements as a fully licensed taxi driver. As a result,
Uber drivers in Dublin are typically traditional taxi drivers who have
also signed up to the Uber platform to work to attract additional customers either during or after work hours. One potential barrier to entry
is that drivers must be licensed by local authorities, as is the case in both
cities, and that the precise requirements vary across jurisdictions.

DRIVER LICENSING IN DUBLIN AND LONDON
The entry test for taxi drivers in Dublin is designed to verify that
new drivers are familiar with good practice and have a solid working
knowledge of the county in which they plan to operate.2 The detailed
and in-depth test consists of 90 questions in two sections:
1) The Industry Knowledge Module consists of 54 questions
relating to industry regulations, vehicle knowledge, map reading, fares and charges, and customer service (including disability awareness and equality and diversity, business acumen
and health and safety), as set out in the module’s manual.
2) The Area Knowledge Module consists of 36 questions related
to the administrative county in which one expects to be
licensed. This aspect of the taxi licensing process is focused on
examining driver familiarity with the area so that passengers’
trips are provided in an efficient and safe manner.
Overall, the process of getting a license in Dublin is significantly
more expensive compared to London because of the in-depth knowledge requirements. In addition to the tests, the driver also must pro-
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duce a tax clearance certificate and undergo a criminal record and a
medical check. The cost of the licensing process is approximately $448
and includes $109 toward the standard driver entry test, $303 toward
the commercial driver license fee, and $36 toward the criminal records
check fee.3 The licenses need to be renewed every five years. These
requirements typically apply to all taxi drivers in the city, including
those that offer ridesharing services through the Uber platform.
The number of available vehicle licenses in Dublin is restricted,
which has resulted in a decline in the number of active taxi driver
licenses (from more than 47,000 in 2009 to less than 27,000 in 2016).
The greatest number of restrictions occurred before 2013, and the number of licensed vehicles remained roughly constant after 2013. In London, the number of licensed taxi vehicles remained roughly constant
during this time.4
The regulations for Uber drivers in London are the same as the
driver of a “private hire” vehicle.5 Specifically, the driver must be at
least 21 years old, hold a full U.K. or European Member State driver’s
permit for at least three years, and, as of 2016, pass an English language test.6 In addition, Uber drivers in London are required to undergo
a criminal record check and a medical examination, as well as take a
topographical knowledge test. The London exam differs substantially
from the one in Dublin. It consists of five modules that assess the ability
of prospective candidates to read maps and plan routes, as well as their
general understanding of London’s topography.
Table 2.1 compares the requirements to enter the market in London
and Dublin. There is considerable variation between the two cities in
terms of the barriers Uber ridesharing drivers face. These differences
let us examine how variations in the stringency of regulation impact
selected indicators of quality. Uber drivers are subject to licensing in
both jurisdictions, since at least some requirements to enter the occupation are in operation, and these are legally binding. Consequently, Uber
ridesharing drivers in London and Dublin are subject to what is referred
to as occupational licensing in the academic literature on regulation
(see, for example, Kleiner 2006, 2015; Koumenta and Pagliero 2016).
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Table 2.1 Summary and Overview of Licensing Requirements for Uber
Drivers in Dublin and London
Educational
requirements

Other entry
requirements

Dublin
Area knowledge test
Industry knowledge test
Driving permit

London
Topographical knowledge test
(based on map reading)

Private hire license (issued
by the National Transport
Authority)
Criminal records check
Medical check
Tax clearance certificate

Private hire license
(issued by Transport for
London)
Criminal records check
Medical check
Minimum driving experience
of at least three years

Minimum age of 18 years
Cost of driver
$448
licensing (approx.)
Renewal
Every five years

Driving permit

English language test (where
applicable)
Minimum age of 21 years
$1,014
Every three years

DATA USED FOR THE ANALYSIS
Uber Technologies supplied the proprietary data, which can be used
for research purposes. Unlike survey data, which may be collected with
less care—an inaccurate response leaves virtually no economic consequences to the firm—this information is unique in that it is what the
company uses for decision making and is collected and compiled with
greater care. In all the analyses, trip-level data were used from November 2013 (Uber expanded to London in July 2012) through December
2016. The data were provided as part of the company’s regular compilation of administrative information without any knowledge about how
the data might be used for analysis or public policy purposes. Unfortunately, no data on tips are available, and since many times tips are given
in cash, this may undervalue the cost of the ride to consumers. To provide a balanced sample for the two cities, the analysis uses the universe
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of 162,386 rides from Dublin. For London, Uber provided a random
sample of 260,081, or 0.5 percent of all rides.7 Appendix A contains the
definitions of the variables in the data set.8
To evaluate the influence of regulation, I collected information from
Uber on the following indicators. First, I obtained data on the quality
of ridesharing through driver-quality ratings for the most widely used
Uber service, UberX. After completing a trip, riders rate the driver on
a scale of one star (lowest quality) to five stars (highest quality). The
value is treated as a “measure of process” or satisfaction since it reflects
the customer experience from the ride. Second, consumer safety is an
important dimension of service quality. Uber made available two measures of safety: hard accelerations and hard braking on individual trips.
Both have been shown to be some of the most predictive factors for car
crashes and accidents (Claims Journal 2015). The values are obtained
when drivers, who use the Uber app, have a passenger in the vehicle
and have the app turned on. Uber drivers in London could usually take
longer for the same distance or generally go on longer trips than in
Dublin. Including a city dummy variable allows a measurement of the
differences of quality of service that is not associated with differences in
transit time or distance. For example, the quality of a ride could deteriorate because of heavy traffic but not because of differences in regulatory
intensity. To account for these issues, the analysis controls include 37
dummy variables for year and month (as one variable); 6 dummies indicating day of the week (Sunday–Saturday); and 23 dummy variables for
hour of travel. If heavy traffic occurs regularly at a given time during a
day, these time fixed effects would pick this up. In addition to the time
fixed effects, we control for location-specific effects. For instance, if
a statistically identical driver in Dublin on a trip of identical duration
and distance brakes more frequently using a busy road than in London
on a four-lane highway, the behavior results from the characteristics of
the road chosen for the specific trip, not from differences in regulatory
intensity. To account for this, the analysis uses a set of 1,023 dummy
variables clustering pickup and drop-off location by longitude and latitude (see Horton 2016).9
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APPROACHES USED IN THE ANALYSIS
Table 2.2 shows the means and observations for the key variables
for the two cities, Dublin and London. The means for trip duration
and trip distance are similar, so one can make meaningful comparisons between them. Also, the observations are similar for both cities.
As shown in the table, it is interesting, however, to find that London
has a shorter estimated time of arrival at the client’s pickup location,
despite being a busier city with more traffic.10 A likely reason for this is
Table 2.2 Means and Number of Observations for the Key Variables in
the Analysis for Dublin and London
Variable
Trip duration (in seconds)
Trip distance (in miles)
Trip fare (in US$)
Surge multiplier
Estimated time of arrival
(in seconds)
Driver experience (no. of trips)
Rider experience (no. of trips)
Rating (1–5 stars)
Fraction of hard brakes
Fraction of hard acceleration
Fraction of hard brake over 0.2
Fraction of hard acceleration
over 0.2
NOTE: N = number of observations.
SOURCE: Uber Technologies.

City
London
Dublin
London
Dublin
London
Dublin
London
Dublin
London
Dublin
London
Dublin
London
Dublin
London
Dublin
London
Dublin
London
Dublin
London
Dublin
London
Dublin

N
471,877
456,834
471,877
456,834
471,877
456,834
471,877
456,834
471,877
456,834
471,877
456,834
471,877
456,834
314,255
303,318
240,890
215,462
183,678
164,016
240,890
215,462
183,678
164,016

Mean
1,219.9190
959.8389
4.6594
4.3947
17.8833
17.6381
1.0755
1.0001
204.3132
252.1905
1927.8160
397.9217
94.5536
60.4299
4.6961
4.7169
0.0823
0.0960
0.0560
0.0607
0.1243
0.1727
0.0676
0.0851
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that since London has more drivers, they may be closer to the rider than
drivers in Dublin. Both riders and drivers are also more experienced
on the Uber app platform in London, indicating that it is an important
control variable in the regression analysis, as Londoners are more likely
to use the service.
Indicators of the relationship of population to driver parameters are
presented in Table 2.3, such as the population to Uber driver ratio for
both cities. The table shows the city’s total population in 2016, and it
is divided by the total number of Uber drivers in the period 2013–2016
(controlling for attrition) for each city. The ratio of the population to
Uber drivers in Dublin is more than twice that of Uber drivers in London. This is in line with expectations given the more stringent entry
regime in Dublin.
Table 2.3 Estimates of Driver to Population Ratio
London
61,892
Total number of licensed drivers who
use the Uber app (2013–2016)
Population (2016, in millions)
8.79
Proportion of population to driver
142

Dublin
1,609
1.331
827

SOURCE: For London: United Nations, World Population Prospects link, https://www
.macrotrends.net/cities/22860/london/population (accessed May 9, 2022). For Dublin, Eurostat, https://www.macrotrends.net/cities/22860/london/population (accessed
May 9, 2022). The value for drivers was obtained from Uber Technologies.

Lastly, Figure 2.1 shows how customer satisfaction with the rides
compares in both cities. The figure includes data for all rated personal
transportation trips completed in Dublin and London between November 2013 and December 2016. It presents the overall skewness of the
ratings system toward five-star ratings, with the distribution of driverquality ratings being relatively consistent across the two cities. As
Figure 2.1 shows, quality ratings are highly right skewed, with nearly
81 percent of trips receiving a five-star rating using both Dublin and
London. In contrast, less than 2 percent of trips receive one star. There
seems to be no substantial difference in how customers rate their experience in Dublin and London. These results could indicate that the more
intense training that ridesharing drivers are subjected to in Dublin does
not translate to better customer evaluations, as one would expect.
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Figure 2.1 Ratings Distribution on UberX Trips in Dublin and London
(November 2013–December 2016)
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Figure 2.2 shows the average per-mile fare in the two cities to relate
to how the price of Uber ridesharing compares between the two cities.
Between November 2013 and December 2016, the average base price
(in U.S. dollars) was $5.58 per mile in Dublin, with a range of $3.00
to $10.00. In contrast, the average base price was $3.31 in London.
The price range was $2.47 to $4.00 based on time and location. When
surge pricing is considered, which is a measure of spot price based on
supply and demand, the values in Dublin increase to a mean of $8.08,
with a range of $4.16 to $25.00. The equivalent mean London prices are
$5.81, with a range of $3.90 to $9.80. Using both methods of measuring
base prices with and without the surge component used by Uber, the
prices are higher in Dublin.
Figure 2.2 also shows the price effect analysis for the period 2013–
2016. Initially, the London fare was higher, but fares in both cities converged in 2015, and then the London fares were lower throughout 2016
and stayed lower throughout the year. However, in the latest period,
London prices were rising slightly; in contrast, Dublin fares have
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Figure 2.2 Average Uber Fare (in US$) per Mile in Dublin and London
(2013–2016)
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NOTE: The error bars are the 95 percent confidence intervals for the prices in both
London and Dublin. The point estimate values are the averages of the fares per mile in
the two cities.
SOURCE: Uber Technologies.

remained relatively stable (with some minor fluctuations). One explanation for the lower prices in London relates to the relatively higher
supply of drivers compared to Dublin, and it is likely to be an outcome
of the less stringent regulatory framework.
Measures of quality take various forms in different industries.
In ridesharing, it is customer satisfaction and safety. If more relaxed
occupational regulation has an influence on the quality of the ride, it is
through these two outcomes. Where the ride takes place, however, is
also an important determinant of both customer satisfaction and safety.
Higher levels of congestion could be associated with greater customer
frustration and an increased chance of a crash. Therefore, where the ride
takes place within the city is a key variable in the analysis of the role
for regulation in ridesharing. Uber hired MIT professor John Horton to
develop the methodology for analysis—a grid based on the longitude
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and latitude of the place of the ride. Location dummies were generated
by the algorithmic program package called TripMatchR. The program
generates a map with numbers of observations in the form of a matrix,
and then forms rectangular groups that have approximately the same
total number of observations to generate the location of the ride. More
specifically the TripMatchR algorithmically implements a geographybased clustering approach that partitions trip locales into “regions” or
“clusters” by partitioning the trips into iso-counts. The approach has
been used in other academic analysis of quality and demand for ridesharing to control of location and time of ride (Hall et al. 2019; Hall,
Horton, and Knoepel 2017).
Based on the estimates from the statistical model the results are
consistent with the baseline graph that satisfaction is about 3 percentage points higher in the relatively more highly regulated Dublin than in
London. The probabilities of getting a three-star and a five-star rating
are according to Figure 2.1, about 4 percent for three-star ratings and
about 81 percent for five-star ratings. If, for example, higher regulation
reduces three-star ratings by 3 percentage points and increases the fivestar ratings by 3 percentage points, the overall distribution would not
change in any meaningful manner, since the five-star ratings occur with
very high probability. However, when trip location is considered, the
results suggest that London and Dublin have no significant difference
on customer satisfaction.
The demand for taxi services is highly responsive to price and perceived safety of the ride. Any brake or acceleration on a trip with a force
greater than 3.06 meters per second squared is considered a hard brake
or hard acceleration, which is consistent with transportation industry
standards (Claims Journal 2015). Both sets of telematics metrics are
used because the distribution of the percentage of hard brakes or hard
accelerations on trips could influence the proportion of trips that are
identified as “safe” trips, using the 20 percent hard brakes or hard accelerations threshold. For example, the proportion of trips with greater than
20 percent hard brakes may differ significantly if hard-braking events
tend to occur in relatively high or relatively low proportions on individual trips versus if hard-braking events tend to be relatively evenly
distributed across trips. Importantly, hard braking has been shown to be
one of the most important factors for predicting future crashes (Claims
Journal 2015). Braking and acceleration events and the rates of braking
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and acceleration on individual trips are identified through the Uber app
on a driver’s smartphone. The estimates show that there is no difference
between Dublin and London in the fraction of hard accelerations when
the location of the trip is controlled for in the analysis. Moreover, the
fractions of all rides where 20 percent or more of the accelerations are
hard are not significantly lower in Dublin than in London when controlling for relevant factors.
The results show a higher probability of hard braking in Dublin,
even controlling for base fare, trip distance (miles), trip duration (seconds), gender, driver experience (trips a driver conducted in their lifetime for Uber), rider experience (number of Uber trips of the rider who
issued the rating), and time fixed effects. However, once the location
effects are included in the model, there is no statistically significant
difference between the two cities; that is, safety is not higher in the
more regulated Dublin. Overall, the results suggest that the rides are no
smoother in Dublin, where the intensity of regulation is higher than in
London.
The key coefficients for each of the outcome variables by city discussed earlier that include customer satisfaction, hard accelerations,
and hard braking are shown in Table 2.4. The estimates in the table
present the influence of an observation in Dublin relative to London on
measures of satisfaction, or corelates of safety such as hard accelerations or hard braking. The results for hard accelerations and braking
are normalized by the fraction of all accelerations or braking during the
trip. The coefficient values shown include controls such as trip distance,
driver experience and their human capital, and the location of the trip.
Table 2.4 Coefficient Estimates and Standard Errors for Customer
Satisfaction, Hard Accelerations, and Hard Braking for
London versus Dublin (where Dublin is 1)
Outcome measure
Coefficient and standard errors
−0.06
Customer satisfaction
(0.05)
Fraction of hard accelerations per trip
0.05
(0.05)
Fraction of hard braking per trip
0.04
(0.04)
SOURCE: Uber Technologies.
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The results show no difference in these outcome measures if a trip was
taken in London or Dublin.

CONCLUSIONS AND POTENTIAL PUBLIC POLICES
This chapter examines how variations in regulatory requirements
affect quality outcomes. Specifically, the approach exploits how the differences in the stringency of becoming a licensed driver offering ridesharing services in London and Dublin affect one measure of perceived
quality (customer satisfaction) and two safety measures (hard accelerations and hard braking) obtained from Uber using the drivers’ app with
controls for area of the city, time of the day, day of week, and week
of the year. Each of these locales has different levels of stringency for
obtaining an occupational license, with barriers to entry being higher in
Dublin. The analysis further describes and explores service availability
and prices as value-added measures of quality. The approach allows for
the examination of the role of regulation when one area (London) provides a more relaxed form of occupational regulation relative to another
one (Dublin).
The results suggest that Uber service availability as measured by
the Uber driver to population ratio is higher in London and prices are
lower. These findings are not surprising since one would expect higher
supply of Uber ridesharing services to be associated with lower prices,
given Uber’s market-driven approach toward ridesharing. Further, customer ratings are only slightly higher in the more stringently regulated
Dublin and, when controlling for location of the ride, the difference is
not statistically significant, which suggests that higher barriers do not
seem to be correlated with customer satisfaction.
The results for safety measures show a higher percentage of trips
with hard braking in Dublin, and this relationship ceases to be statistically significant when there are controls for location of the trip. In the
empirical analysis across different specifications and statistical models
regarding hard accelerations, the results also show that users have no
higher-rated rides in Dublin, where the regulations are more stringent
when controls for the location of the trip are considered. Based on these
two safety indicators, there seems to be no justification for the consider-
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ably higher hurdles that ridesharing drivers must pass to legally operate
in Dublin.
Overall, we find little evidence for greater regulatory constraints
(at least of the type observed in these two jurisdictions) on ridesharing drivers. Further, the technological context for taxi and ridesharing
driving is considerably different from when the regulatory provisions
for taxi drivers were initially developed and physical maps were used
for navigation. GPS technology, for example, provides drivers with
detailed route information as well as information on traffic congestion,
enabling them to conduct more efficient trips. The same technology
is available to customers, so information asymmetry is lower. Consequently, it is questionable whether regulations with detailed topographical knowledge are as relevant as they used to be. Technologies that
allow customers to rate their trips and the driver can mitigate problems
associated with experience goods by ensuring that service standards are
maintained. The broad conclusion from the assessment in this chapter
is that the regulations of the taxi and ridesharing driving occupations
should be changed to allow easier entry into the occupation. The relaxation of occupational licensing in this sector could lead to lower prices
without any evidence that it would reduce customer satisfaction or the
safety of the ride.
Notes
1. Uber has agreed to provide the data it collects through its app to address the
research questions in this study. There were no incentives for Uber to provide data
that might skew the data or results, since they were unaware of the approach or
methods prior to providing the data.
2. These requirements are set out in the Taxi Regulation Act 2013 and the Taxi Regulation (Small Public Service Vehicle) Regulations 2015 (see www.irishstatute
book.ie for all legal texts).
3. Author’s own calculations based on information from the National Transport
Authority available at https://www.nationaltransport.ie/taxi-and-bus-licensing/
taxi/spsv-driver-licensing/apply-for-an-spsv-driver-licence-2/ (accessed June 22,
2022).
4. See data tables link here: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/taxi-and
-private-hire-vehicles-statistics-england-2015, Table ‘Taxi0101’ (accessed June
22, 2022).
5. Private-hire vehicles are only permitted to pick up prearranged bookings and are
not permitted to pick people up from the curb side. Taxis (also known as London
black cabs) are licensed to pick people up from the curb side, i.e., hailing a cab.
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6. https://tfl.gov.uk/info-for/taxis-and-private-hire/licensing/private-hire-driver
-licence (accessed June 22, 2022).
7. From all Uber data, observations from London and Dublin were selected if they
have rating and telematics information (some observations do not have both).
The random sample for London was obtained using the simple random sampling
method with replacement by repeating the following steps 10 times: 1) generate
random numbers and assign them to each observation; 2) select a subset of these
observations for the final sample according to the population ratio between London and Dublin.
8. The specific data are available on the time and dates of pickups and drop-offs from
Uber. The data used had at least 1,000 pickups and drop-offs for every time and
day and several thousand for peak periods.
9. The algorithm developed by Horton uses Python as its engine to generate a map
with number of observations in a form of matrix, and then forms rectangular
groups that have approximately the same total number of observations in the
matrix using the TripMatchR program (Horton 2016).
10. There was one outlier in Dublin, likely due to a coding error, which increases the
standard errors, and deleting it has little impact on the other variables.

References
Barrett, Sean D. 2003. “Regulatory Capture, Property Rights and Taxi Deregulation: A Case Study.” Economic Affairs 23(4): 34–40.
———. 2010. “The Sustained Impacts of Taxi Deregulation.” Economic
Affairs 30(1): 61–65.
Beesley, Michael E. 1973. “Regulation of Taxis.” Economic Journal 83(329):
150–172.
Cevero, R. 1985. “Safeguarding Suburban Mobility.” Transportation Research
Record 1079: 16–23.
Claims Journal. 2015. “Hard Braking Most Likely Predictor of Future
Crashes: Progressive Data.” May 19. https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/
national/2015/05/19/263424.htm (accessed December 13, 2021).
Dempsey, Paul Stephen. 1996. “Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation and
Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure.” Transport Law Journal
24(1): 73–120.
DMR Statistics. 2017. “Uber Statistics, User Counts, Facts & News.” http://
expandedramblings.com/index.php/uber-statistics/ (accessed June 28, 2017).
Financial Times. 2017. “How Uber and London Ended Up in a Taxi War.”
September 27.
Hall, Jonathan, Jason Hicks, Morris M. Kleiner, and Rob Solomon. 2019.
“Occupational Licensing of Uber Drivers.” Stanford, CA: Stanford Institute
for Theoretical Economics.

Ridesharing in London and Dublin 27
Hall, Jonathan, John Horton, and Daniel Knoepel. 2017. “Labor Market Equilibration: Evidence from Uber.” Working paper. San Francisco: Uber Technologies.
Horton, John J. 2016. “TripMatchR” Version 1.0. http://john-joseph-horton
.com/software/ (accessed December 13, 2021).
Huang, Wan-Ting, Chih-His Chang, Yu-Fen Hsu, and Jen-Hsiang Chuang.
2015. “Prognostic Factors for Mortality in Patients Hospitalized with Influenza Complications, in Taiwan.” International Health 7(1): 73–75.
Katz, Lawrence F., and Alan B. Krueger. 2016. “The Rise and Nature of
Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995–2015.” Working Paper No. w22667. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
———. 2019. “The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the
United States, 1995–2015.” ILR Review 72(2): 382–416.
Kleiner, Morris M. 2006. Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
———. 2015. Guild-Ridden Labor Markets: The Curious Case of Occupational Licensing. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
Kleiner, Morris M., and Alan B. Krueger. 2010. “The Prevalence and Effects
of Occupational Licensing.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 48(4):
676–687.
———. 2013. “Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing
on the Labor Market.” Journal of Labor Economics 31(2): S173–202.
Koumenta, Maria, and Mario Pagliero. 2016. Measuring Prevalence and
Labour Market Impacts of Occupational Regulation in the EU. European
Commission Report. Brussels: European Commission.
Rojeck, Miłosz, and Michał Masior. 2016. The Effects of Reforms Liberalising
Professional Requirements in Poland, European Commission Report. Warsaw: Warsaw School of Economics.
Satariano, Adam. 2018. “Uber Regains Its License to Operate in London, a Win
for Its New C.E.O.” New York Times, June 26. https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/26/technology/uber-london.html (accessed December 13, 2021).
———. 2021. “Uber Drivers Are Entitled to Worker Benefits, a British Court
Rules.” New York Times, February 19. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/19/
business/uber-drivers-britain.html (accessed December 13, 2021).
Schaller, Bruce. 2007. “Entry Controls in Taxi Regulation: Implications of US
and Canadian Experience for Taxi Regulation and Deregulation.” Transport
Policy 14(6): 490–506.
Shleifer, Andrei. 2010. “Efficient Regulation.” In Regulation vs. Litigation:

28 Kleiner
Perspectives from Economics and Law, Daniel Kessler, ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 27–43.
Szary, Wiktor. 2017. “London Commuters Surprised by Transport Threat to
Stop Uber Service. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/
london-commuters-surprised-by-transport-threat-to-stop-uber-service
-1506102210 (accessed June 21, 2022).
Teal, Roger F., and Mary Berglund. 1987. “The Impacts of Taxicab Deregulation in the USA.” Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 21(1): 37–56.

Appendix 2A
Table 2A.1 Variable Descriptions of the Data from Uber
Variable
City
Trip duration
Trip distance
Client fare
Driver experience
Gender
Surge pricing

Rider experience
Month
Day of week
Hour
Begin trip cluster

End trip cluster

Description
Indicator for city, 0 = London and 1 = Dublin
Time spent for the driver to provide service from the departure
location to destination, in seconds
Distance travelled for providing the service from the departure
location to destination, in miles
Amount charged for the given service, in US$
Number of trips that the driver provided on the Uber platform
until the time he/she provided the current service
Gender of the driver, 0 = Female and 1 = Male
An algorithmic technique that Uber used when there is a
demand-supply imbalance to determine fares. Usually, the
company raises the price of its offering if there is an increase in
demand.
Number of trips that the rider received on the Uber platform
until the time he/she provided the current service
Thirty-seven dummy variables for each month between
November 2013 and December 2016.
Six dummy variables for day of the week, i.e., for Monday
through Sunday.
Twenty-three dummy variables for hour of the day.
Dummy variables generated by R package (TripMatchR)
developed by Dr. John Horton of MIT that generates 1,023
Boolean variables that indicate geographical clusters for the
pickup and drop-off locations. see Horton (2016).
Boolean variables that indicate geographical clusters for the
pickup and drop-off locations. see Horton (2016).
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The driving instructor profession is regulated in most countries
based on road safety and consumer protection against accidents and
fatalities. However, the regulations and criteria are inconsistent across
Europe. The U.K., for example, has one of the least restrictive regimes
for becoming a driving instructor. Although there are stipulations
regarding the type of training required, the corresponding exams, and
subsequent testing for competence, there are no preconditions regarding primary or secondary education, the length of required training, or
mandatory traineeship. This is in sharp contrast with some European
counterparts, where a postsecondary education is often required (such
as in Finland, Greece, and Romania), as well as lengthy training provisions (e.g., 300 hours in Belgium; 630 hours in France; two years in
Estonia, Greece, and Ireland). This cross-country variation raises questions about whether higher levels of licensing stringency are correlated
with better safety outcomes for road users.
The first initiative to formalize eligibility to teach individuals driving skills in the U.K. came in the late 1950s from the Motor Schools
Association and the Royal Automobile Club (both independent associations formed by owners of driving schools). The register of approved
driving instructors (ADIs) was accepted by the U.K. Parliament in 1964,
and in 1970 membership of the register became compulsory, meaning
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that any person giving paid instruction to drive a motor car whose name
is not on the register is guilty of an offense. Thus, in occupational regulation terms, driving instructors in the U.K. are licensed. As we show in
the next section, however, a dual market of fully trained (licensed) and
trainee driving (in the process of becoming licensed) instructors was in
operation, both of which were eligible to provide driver teaching.
More recently, there have been changes involving the tightening of
licensing requirements and the de facto abolition of the dual market for
driving instruction. In this chapter we assess the impact of these proposals on the quality of the instructors and the service provided. In particular, we examine whether stricter licensing regulations imposed on
driving instructors have resulted in better-quality providers operating in
the market and better outcomes for learners as measured by their success in various aspects of the driving test. Empirically this is achieved
by comparing such outcomes before and after the reforms took place.

REGULATORY CONTEXT
The Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency is the U.K. regulatory
body that manages the register of licensed driving instructors. To qualify, applicants must pass a criminal record check, followed by success
in a three-part test administered by the agency:
• Part 1: a computer-based driving/instructional theory and hazard
perception test
• Part 2: a practical driving ability test
• Part 3: a practical instructional ability test
After candidates pass the first two tests, they can then apply to the
regulatory body for a trainee license, which allows them to give paid
driving instruction without supervision by a licensed instructor before
taking the Part 3 qualifying test. The cost of taking all the required tests,
obtaining a trainee license, and joining the ADI Register is approximately $1,030, of which about $150 goes toward the cost of the Part
3 test (i.e., the cost of moving from a trainee to an ADI). Registration
is for four years, after which there is a renewal application. The total
fee covers the issue of the ADI license and other administration costs,

Tougher Licensing Requirements and Quality Outcomes 33

the cost of the check test, and a further Disclosure and Barring Service
check prior to renewing their license at the end of the four-year period.
Only certified ADIs or potential ADIs who have been granted
a trainee license by the regulator (hereafter “trainee instructor”) can
give paid, in-car driving instruction. In practice, the driving instructor profession in the U.K. operates as a dual market of certified ADIs
(fully qualified to provide instruction), and partially qualified (trainee)
driving instructors also legally allowed to give instruction. The difference between the two is that the former have passed Part 3 of the test,
whereas the latter have only passed Parts 1 and 2. Therefore, in theory,
it is left to the consumer to choose between the two service providers.
Although instructors are legally required to inform the students of their
status (through displaying their badge when they are giving instruction), anecdotal evidence collected by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing
Agency showed that learners tend not to be aware of whether they are
receiving instruction from a fully approved (ADI) or a trainee instructor, and the fee they were paying was often the same regardless of the
instructor’s status.

THE REFORM PROPOSALS
In 2013, the U.K. government reviewed the regulatory framework
for driving instructors. Concerns were raised regarding the extent to
which, after qualifying as fully approved instructor, individuals started
deviating from the guidance provided by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. For this reason, in 2014 a new “standards check” was
introduced that requires ADIs to undergo further assessment of their
instructional methods at least once during the four-year period that their
license is valid; otherwise, they risk being dropped from the register.
The process involves an assessor observing and grading the ADI; the
grade range is A (indicating a high standard of driving instruction), B
(sufficient level of competence), or Fail (unsatisfactory driving instruction performance). The new system was largely seen as a tightening of
the right-to-practice regulations in the industry.
Additional concerns emerged regarding the low completion rates
among trainee driving instructors as evidenced by the large proportion
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of individuals who had completed the minimum required training (i.e.,
Parts 1 and 2) but had not progressed to complete the process (i.e.,
Part 3) and become ADIs. There was also evidence of high failure rates
among those trainee instructors in the Part 3 test on instructional ability, despite multiple attempts. As a result, the market was populated by
a mix of fully trained instructors and trainees (many with questionable
ability to ever qualify), both of which could offer identical services and
often at a similar price. Overall, this regime was seen to be compromising the quality of instruction received by prospective drivers, disincentivising trainee driving instructors from fully qualifying, and not
providing transparency to the public, thus driving down standards in the
market. As a result, the government put forward proposals to reform the
trainee license scheme. In addition to improvements in the qualification
tests, the proposals stipulated that trainee license holders cannot provide driving lessons for money unless they are accompanied by a fully
licensed ADI for at least part of the duration of the total instruction.

RELEVANT LITERATURE
There is a marked absence of studies on the regulation of driving
instructors and its impact on quality. One exception is a study on the
deregulation of Portuguese driving schools in the late 1990s (Seim and
Vitorino 2011). Prior to the reform, driving schools were heavily regulated by the state. There were restrictions on the numbers of licenses
issued based on population size and minimum distance requirements
from competitors. Additionally, the state imposed fee caps on the
schools’ pricing. These regulations were partially lifted in 1998, and
preliminary results show that it had a direct impact on service availability as evidenced by a 116 percent increase in the number of driving schools by 2010. Avrillier, Hivert, and Kramarz (2010) explore the
effect of a demand shock (the end of conscription in France, which
automatically provided young French men with a driving license) on
the heavily regulated French driving school industry. Their results demonstrate that as a result of the rigid entry restrictions (which included
a long and costly path to become an instructor), the industry could not
respond by quickly increasing supply (as it would have done if it was
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competitive), and therefore service availability suffered. The authors
also find an increase in the price of driving lessons (even when the
industry finally started growing) and a reduction in the number of individuals getting their licenses (which can be attributed to either better
screening of low-skilled students or a deterioration of the quality of
instruction offered by driving instructors).
Turning to the wider literature, we find some studies that parallel
the rationale and quality measures proposed here. Several studies have
examined the relationship between regulation stringency within the
teaching profession and its effect on quality, using student test scores
as an indicator of the latter. We deem these to be of interest, given that
driving instructors are also engaged in a form of teaching. An early
study by Kleiner and Petree (1988) examines the impact of variations in
the restrictiveness of licensing on educational performance using statelevel data for the 1972–1982 period. Their measures of performance
include the average level of the SAT and ACT standardized test scores
and the proportion of students who graduate high school; their results
are mixed and dependent on the estimation technique. With regard to
the standardized scores, the authors find a positive relationship between
regulation and standardized test scores, while the reverse is true for
graduation rates. In a similar vein, Angrist and Guryan (2004) study the
relationship between testing prospective teachers (to certify they meet
minimum standards) and subsequent performance by students. Their
evidence is also mixed in that while students of accredited teachers do
better on the Praxis test, teacher testing has a negative effect on the average SAT score of a teacher’s undergraduate institution. Kane, Rockoff,
and Staiger (2005) also find little difference in student achievement
between students taught by licensed, unlicensed, and certified teachers in the same schools in New York, while Kane and Staiger (2005),
using a quality measure based on improvements in student achievement, again find no evidence that licensed teachers are more effective.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The Department of Transport and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing
Agency produce publicly available data on driving test pass rates for
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students and instructors that are on the U.K. government’s website in
a series of Excel files. The raw files are not organized in a consistent
manner by geographical and time units. To remedy this, we aggregate
the geographical units up to postcode level, maximizing the number of
observations within panels. We are thus left with a data set of observations (time points) nested within U.K. postcode areas.
Within these files, we extract four measures of quality relating to
the instruction and service. First, driving instructor quality within postcode by time cells is proxied by driving instructor practical test pass
rates (Part 2 test). Second, quality of service is proxied by practical
driving test pass rates of students. This is supplemented with two more
indicators of service quality: practical test pass rates at first attempt and
practical test pass rates at the first attempt with zero faults (a perfect
test score).
Our goals in this chapter are as follows. First, we want to establish
whether the reforms affected the quality of instructors as measured by
their success in the Part 2 test. The reforms would have had a positive
effect on the quality of instructors if it deterred those with substandard
skills from entering the occupation. As such, we would expect to see an
increase in the pass rates of instructors in the Part 2 test. Second, using
the three indicators of learner outcomes (practical driving test pass
rates, pass at first attempt, and pass at first attempt with zero faults), we
examine whether the quality of service changed after the reform. Our
analytical approach follows similar studies on the impact of licensing
on teachers where teacher quality is derived from variables relating to
student performance in relevant tests (see section on related literature).
Third, we examine whether the reforms discouraged substandard trainee
instructors from entering the occupation and/or encouraged them to exit
it, as well as whether it incentivized trainees to take the tests so that they
can fully qualify as fully licensed trainers (i.e., to switch from trainees
to ADIs). In the final part of our analysis, we use price data from the
U.K. Office for National Statistics to estimate changes in the cost of
driving lessons.
The analysis examines descriptive trends in the numbers of trainees and fully qualified instructors over time and descriptive trends in
several quality indicators, particularly before and after the reform. We
extend this by examining variation in trends pre- and postreform within
postcode areas by whether postcode areas fell into the top, middle, or
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bottom tercile in terms of the share of instructors who were trainees
prior to the reform. This is an especially informative analysis as we
expect the reform to affect both instructor and learner outcomes through
its effect on the ratio of trainees to fully qualified instructors. Finally,
we test the robustness of the descriptive associations by controlling for
other factors that can account for the observed trends.

RESULTS
We begin by describing key aggregate trends in the data, starting
with the number of instructors (see Figure 3.1). As can be seen, over
time there has been a sharp decline in the number of trainee instructors
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Figure 3.1 Number of Qualified and Trainee Driving Instructors
over Time
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% trainee instructors (RH axis)
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the Department of Transport and the
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency.
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and a smaller decline of qualified instructors (ADIs). Overall, the number of trainees is much smaller than the number of qualified instructors.
The proportion of instructors who are trainees has fallen relatively dramatically, from around 12 percent in March 2012 to around 3 percent in
March 2017. Examining the timing of the decline, it appears there were
some anticipatory effects of the reform proposals (which became operational in April 2014). It is possible, for example, that trainee instructors
who did not feel competent enough to pass the Part 3 exam and qualify as ADIs exited the market, leaving only the more competent ones
active. Unfortunately, the data do not go back further in time, so we are
unable to provide a longer-term picture to put this decline into context.
Nonetheless, on the surface, the reform proposals have influenced the
composition of instructors, which translates to fewer driving instructors
in the market.
Turning to trends in the indicators of instructor quality, there was
a 4 percentage point increase in the pass rate of trainee instructors in
Part 2 (the driving practical) between March 2012 and March 2017,
indicating that the average quality of instructors (at least new entrants
and as judged by their success in this exam) has been improving over
time (Figure 3.2). The rate of upward trend in pass rates seemed to
increase after April 2014 (see the fitted values that fit a quadratic trend
term). One possible explanation is that in anticipation of the reform,
which would make entry and operation in the market more stringent,
the low-quality prospective driving instructors were discouraged from
entering the occupation. Overall, we can rule out explanations relating to the exam becoming easier or simpler, or those relating to any
improvements in the training and support prospective driving instructors received between the two periods, as we know that the procedure
and requirements remained the same.
We examine trends in instructor pass rates by whether postcode
areas fall into the bottom, middle, or top third of the distribution of
shares in trainee instructors for the period prior to the reform (Figure
3.3). If the reform increased the average quality of trainee instructors
(as measured by pass rates on the instructor practical tests), then we
might see steeper increases in pass rates in those areas that initially
had a higher share of trainee instructors (as their higher share in those
areas would translate to higher pass rates). While we find definite differences in pass rates prior to the reform proposals, with pass rates being
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NOTE: Authors’ calculations using data from the Department of Transport and the
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency.

the lowest in areas with the highest share of trainee instructors, pass
rates seem to improve the most in areas that had lower shares of trainee
instructors to begin with.
Turning to our proxies for service quality for learners, before the
reform, we observe a general upward trend in total practical test pass
rates (Figure 3.4)—the part of the qualification process that is affected
by driving instructors. After the reform, trends in practical test pass rates
slowed and levelled out. By contrast, the theory test pass rates have
been steadily falling, likely due in part to stricter standards imposed by
the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. Since the theory test must
be taken before the practical test, the upward trend in practical pass
rates may be due to elimination of very low ability would-be drivers
who cannot pass the theory test as the procedures became stricter rather
than an improvement in the quality of tuition received by would-be
drivers. In Figure 3.5, we explore two more fine-grained measures of
performance in the practical test: pass rates at first attempt (as learners
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the Department of Transport and the
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency.

can take the test multiple times if they fail) and zero-faults pass rates
at first attempt (obtaining a perfect score on their first attempt). Here
too we find similar trends as with the overall pass rates for the practical
test: a general upward trend that levels out after the reform proposals.
On the face of it, then, it appears the reform has had no visible effect on
the quality of the service as measured by performance on the practical
test by learners.
Finally, we explore whether trends in practical test pass rates vary
over time according to the share of instructors who were trainees prior
to the reform (Figure 3.6). While we find clear differences in pass rates
according to the share of instructors who were trainees, with postcodes
in the bottom third having significantly lower pass rates than all of the
postcodes, we find trends that are broadly similar to those in Figure 3.4.
Consequently, even in this more fine-grained approach, we find little
evidence that the reform resulted in higher pass rates for learners.
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Multivariate Estimates
Our analysis so far has been descriptive in nature. As such, it does
not consider other factors that might account for the associations we
observe in the previous graphs. We can improve on this approach by
comparing each of the quality indicators before and after the reform,
stripping out all the time-invariant factors that might affect the outcomes of interest.1 In terms of exploring the effect of the reform on
instructors, we examine four outcomes (which relate to our previous
descriptive analysis):
1) The number of trainee instructors. This is a proxy for the number of people wanting to enter the profession as an ADI. If this
decreased after the reform, it could signify that new and possibly lower-skilled individuals were discouraged from entering
the profession or decided to exit because of concerns about
their ability to qualify (i.e., pass the Part 3 test).
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2) The number of Part 3 tests taken. If these decrease, it could
also signify discouraging new and low-quality entrants.2
3) The pass rate of instructors taking the practical test (defined as
the percentage of passes over the number of tests taken). If the
pass rate increases, it may signify an increase in quality of new
instructors after the reform.
4) The number of qualified instructors before and after the reform
proposals.
Starting with the estimates for instructor outcomes (Table 3.1), we
find that the number of trainee instructors fell in the period following
the reform proposals relative to before it (Column 1), and that this is
robust to the general time trend (Column 2). This translates to roughly
78 percent fewer trainee instructors within postcodes on average in the
period after the reforms. Nonetheless, the number of Part 3 tests being
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taken appears to be higher than the general trend after the reform proposals once the time trend is taken into account (Column 4), while the
pass rate of trainees was no different before and after the reform proposals once general time trends are taken into account (Column 6). Finally,
the number of qualified instructors was lower after the reforms but only
marginally—by roughly 1.7 percent (Column 8). Taken together, these
results imply that more tests are being taken postreform than expected,
but at the same time the number of instructors is falling despite the pass
rate remaining stable, perhaps due to exiting.
We examine another four outcomes in terms of the effect on driving
students. First, the number of practical tests taken by students. If this
falls postreform, it may indicate a fall in the access to instructors, and
so fewer people are taking the test within a given time period. Second,
the pass rate of the practical test (defined as the percentage of passes
over the number of tests taken). This is a straightforward indicator of

(7)
(8)
Number of qualified
instructors (log)
−0.112*** −0.017***
(0.014)
(0.004)
−0.003***
(0.000)
5.483***
5.687***
(0.010)
(0.039)
0.995
0.996
4,752
4,752
147
147

NOTE: *significant at the 0.05 level; **significant at the 0.01 level; ***significant at the 0.001 level. Robust standard errors clustered on
postcode area in parentheses.
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Table 3.1 Fixed-Effects Regression Models of Instructor Outcomes Pre- and Postreform
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Number of trainee
Number of Part 3 tests
Part 3
instructors (log)
(log)
test pass rate
Pre vs.
−1.017*** −1.531*** −0.811***
0.260***
4.243*** −1.442
post period
(0.047)
(0.071)
(0.054)
(0.066)
(1.122)
(1.272)
Time trend
0.015***
−0.019***
0.102***
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.017)
Constant
2.485***
1.379***
4.680***
5.517*** 52.561*** 48.121***
(0.034)
(0.138)
(0.014)
(0.047)
(0.280)
(0.856)
2
R
0.741
0.755
0.623
0.812
0.464
0.501
4,752
4,752
7,128
7,128
7,116
7,116
N obs
147
147
78
78
78
78
N panels
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the quality of instruction. Third, the pass rate at first attempt. Fourth,
the proportion of passes at the first attempt with zero faults (a perfect
score). These latter two are also straightforward indicators of the quality of instruction.
Turning to the estimates for learner outcomes (Table 3.2), we examine the number of practical tests taken by students and find that there
is no difference before and after the reforms (Column 1), but when we
take into account the reduction in practical tests through the time trend,
the number of tests taken is about 13 percent higher (Column 2). We
also find higher pass rates after the reform than before it (Column 3),
but once we consider the general upward trend in pass rates (as previously mentioned, perhaps this is due to the tightening up of the theory
test procedures), we find the effect in fact becomes negative. There is a
similar pattern of both higher pass rates at first attempt and zero faults
at first attempt being higher in the period following the reform, but yet
again, once we factor in the general time trends in these two outcomes,
the pass rates in the period postreform become lower than before it.
Overall, these improved estimates further confirm the robustness of our
descriptive analysis.

PRICE OF DRIVING LESSONS
In the final part of our analysis, we use data from the U.K. Office
for National Statistics to calculate the price of driving lessons (one
hour) before and after the reform proposals. We present data on both
the nominal price and the price adjusted for 2017 CPI. As Figure 3.7
shows, after a period of falling real prices, the price of driving lessons
increased after the reform proposals. Although the price of a driving
lesson at the cut-off date of the last available data is still lower than it
was before the reform proposals, there is a clear upward trajectory. One
possible explanation for this trend relates to the lower availability of
driving instructors in the market after the reform proposals, which has
enabled incumbents to increase their fees.

NOTE: *significant at the 0.05 level; **significant at the 0.01 level; ***significant at the 0.001 level. Robust standard errors clustered on
postcode area in parentheses.
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Table 3.2 Fixed-Effects Regression Estimates of Learner Outcomes Pre- and Postreform
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Number of practical
Practical tests pass
Practical test pass rates
Test pass rates
rate(first attempt)
(zero faults)
tests taken
Pre vs. post
−0.009
0.127***
1.283*** −1.147***
1.752*** −1.533***
0.535*** −0.032
period
(0.022)
(0.020)
(0.269)
(0.263)
(0.257)
(0.234)
(0.043)
(0.046)
Time trend
−0.002***
0.042***
0.061***
0.011***
(0.000)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.001)
Constant
6.766***
6.866*** 47.888*** 46.107*** 47.189*** 44.426***
0.647***
0.170**
(0.006)
(0.017)
(0.073)
(0.240)
(0.066)
(0.286)
(0.011)
(0.052)
R2
0.906
0.909
0.744
0.763
0.835
0.875
0.638
0.729
13,412
13,412
13,400
13,400
12,396
12,396
12,396
12,396
N obs.
116
116
116
116
116
116
116
116
N panels
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CONCLUSION
Entry into the profession of driving instructor in the U.K. has been
subject to compulsory training requirements, although in practice there
was a dual market of fully trained and trainee driving instructors who
both could offer instruction for payment. This study aimed to explore
the impact of the proposals to reform the driving instructor occupation in the U.K. In particular, the state was concerned that the quality
of instruction offered to prospective drivers was compromised because
trainee driving instructors often were not able to finish their training
and therefore may be unable to provide the same quality instruction as
fully licensed instructors. The 2014 reform initiatives were designed to
increase the stringency of regulations such that only ADIs or trainees
accompanied by ADIs would be able to offer paid tuition. In addition,
the U.K. made the requirements to demonstrate continuing professional
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competence more strict. In this study, we assess the effect that the proposed changes had on the quality of service.
Starting with service availability, we looked at various outcomes
for instructors. Our results show that the number of trainee instructors
fell in the period following the reform proposals relative to before, with
around 78 percent fewer trainee instructors within postcodes on average
in the period after. There was also a small drop in the number of trainee
driving instructors qualifying as ADIs. We interpret this as a sign that
the reform proposals discouraged instructors in the labor market from
continuing to practice (e.g., those that had previously failed the Part
3 test) or from entering the market in the first place. In that sense, the
reform proposals meet their goals. However, the question is whether
this reduced availability of driving instructors in the market (which can
be adverse for consumers) translated to any benefits for the other quality indicators.
The reform proposals also seem to have put some pressure on
trainee instructors to take the relevant tests so they could qualify (as the
reform proposals intended), but we do not observe an improvement in
the Part 3 test pass rates before and after. As such, we find no evidence
of improvement in the quality of instructors. Turning to the outcomes
for learners, we note that in addition to the proposed restrictions on
the ability of trainee instructors to provide fully unsupervised instruction, we have the parallel improvements in the standards check (i.e., the
review of instructional methods that happens once every four years),
both of which were intended to affect the quality of instruction offered.
Overall, we do not find any improvement in the three quality measures
of learner performance. If anything, overall pass rates, pass rates at first
attempt, and zero faults all become negative (once time trends are considered). Why these measures deteriorate is an open question, but our
broad conclusion is that the reform proposals are certainly not showing
an improvement in the quality of driving students as we had expected.
Our final measures of quality relate to prices. We find that the price
of a one-hour lesson increased after the reform proposals. This is in line
with expectations relating to how the lower supply of practitioners in
the market is likely to affect the cost of these services. Given that the
state does not specify a minimum number of driving lessons learners
have to do before taking the driving test, it is possible that the trend of
increasing prices we observe is affecting demand for driving lessons.
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To conclude, the reform proposals attempted to make access to the
driving instructor occupation more stringent. From the evidence presented here, it is doubtful whether this has resulted in better quality
outcomes. Our findings echo other studies that have on average failed to
show that more intense driver education courses produce safer drivers.
A recent review of international data on accidents by the U.S. Department of Transportation (2009), for example, concludes that there is
little evidence that the crash records of those who underwent intensive
formal training are different from those who did not. Instead, according to the report, traffic management, attitudes, motivations, peer influences, and cognitive and decision-making skills are more influential
in shaping driving behaviors (see also Abdel-Aty and Radwan [2000];
French et al. [1993]; and Sümer [2003] for further evidence). While a
detailed analysis of this body of work is beyond the scope of this study,
the findings have led many to question what should be expected of driving instructors and the stringency of the level of training to which they
should be subject in order to meet such expectations (Waller 1978). A
key contribution of our analysis to such policy debates is to show that
service quality in the market for driving instruction does not change
much with more stringent entry criteria. The fact that we find no evidence that increasing the hurdles to become licensed is associated with
better outcomes deserves attention from policymakers in highly regulated jurisdictions. Overall, we think that the findings from this chapter
make a contribution to these wider debates about the optimal level of
regulation of driving instructors.
Notes
1. This empirical strategy is known as fixed effects regression models in econometrics.
2. As before, we do not expect this to be affected by the cost of the Part 3 exam (i.e.,
£111 of a total of £750).
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In Italy, as well as in many other countries, the work of pharmacists and the production, trade, and distribution of drugs is heavily
regulated—justifiably so, considering the dangers associated with the
improper use of medicines. Most drugs must be distributed through an
authorized pharmacy, the main exception being over-the-counter (OTC)
drugs, which are subject to lighter regulation. Pharmacies must employ
licensed pharmacists, who are subject to educational requirements. The
number of pharmacies and their locations are also subject to strict regulation, and they are established through an administrative procedure
that links the number of pharmacies in a given city to the size of the
local population. The rules used to determine the number of pharmacies
in each city are relatively stable, although significant changes occurred
in 1991 and 2012, which provided for increases in pharmacies.
Since the price of most drugs sold in Italian pharmacies (with the
exception of OTC drugs) is also regulated, the key factor affecting the
quality of the service is product accessibility. Therefore, this chapter
focuses on the impact of regulation on the availability of pharmacies
and its potential effects on human health. We use health outcomes measures from hospital admission records that can capture the potential
impact of access to medicines (and the other services provided in pharmacies) on the health of the population.
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INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: THE EUROPEAN
PHARMACY MARKET
The pharmacy market in Europe is characterized by significant government control on entry, scope of activities, and profit margins. After a
series of reforms over the past two decades, the system began to change.
Vogler, Habimana, and Arts (2014) classify countries into two
broad groups: regulated countries, such as Austria, Denmark, Finland,
and Spain, and less-regulated countries, such as England, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.1 In general, regulated countries
apply demographic rules (e.g., number of potential consumers for each
pharmacy) and geographic criteria (e.g., distance to existing pharmacies) to determine entry into the market. Moreover, they tend to impose
restrictions on ownership of pharmacies. Less-regulated countries were
subject to different types of liberalization.2
The authors find that after deregulation, the number of pharmacies
increased and the number of inhabitants per pharmacy dropped. This
phenomenon was particularly strong in Norway and Sweden. These new
pharmacies tend to be established mainly in urban areas, with few new
pharmacies in rural areas. There are indications of an increased workload for pharmacists in some deregulated countries. Moreover, they
note that after liberalization, specific stakeholders, such as wholesalers,
may gain market power and possibly limit competition (Norway), partially offsetting the increase in competition because of the larger number of pharmacies. Anell (2005) finds somewhat similar results in his
study of the pharmacy market in Norway and Iceland—namely that the
number of pharmacies increases (and prices tend to decrease), but also
concentration seems to increase as a result of horizontal integration of
formerly independent pharmacies.
Schaumans and Verboven (2008) study entry and conduct regulation of pharmacies and physicians in Belgium, where both professions
have regulated fees and markups, and where there is a ban on most
types of advertising. Moreover, there are significant restrictions to entry
based on geography and size of the local population. The presence of
these kinds of regulations is often justified to ensure a minimum availability of supply in less profitable regions without inducing excessive
entry elsewhere. The authors evaluate this public interest motivation
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and develop a model of entry by two types of professions: physicians
and pharmacists. The results show that entry in one profession has a
positive effect on the profitability of entry into the other profession,
supporting the idea that these professions are strategic complements.
Moreover, geographical entry restrictions substantially limit the number of firms. They conclude that the current regime of highly regulated
markups and restricted entry seems to protect the private interests of
existing pharmacies more than the public interests. They also suggest
that it is possible to induce a large shift in rents to consumers without
reducing geographic coverage by combining reductions in geographical
and markup restrictions.
The Italian Pharmacy Market
Pharmacists are entitled to distribute prescription drugs to consumers. They are required to meet educational requirements and pass
a licensing exam. OTC drugs can be distributed to consumers within
pharmacies, supermarkets, and other shops.3 In the latter two cases, a
pharmacist must always be present during store hours.4 There is little
variability in the type of service provided by Italian pharmacies, since
prices are fixed and the training and skills of pharmacists are strictly
regulated. Hence, the most important aspect of quality is the accessibility of pharmacies to consumers. This is particularly relevant in smaller
towns and villages, namely in rural areas, where older consumers (or
those affected by chronic pathologies) might have substantial mobility
problems.
There are few studies on the Italian market for pharmacies. Calzolari et al. (2013) investigate how pharmacies adjust prices based on
the composition of their consumers. They empirically study the pricing strategies of Italian pharmacies in the market for diapers and some
hygiene products, whose prices are not regulated. The empirical estimation strategy exploits the demographic rule that links the number of
pharmacies to the population size in each city (this approach will be
described in detail below). The results show that more competitive markets tend to have significantly lower prices. Mocetti (2016) provides
evidence that the possibility of inheriting the ownership of a pharmacy
may affect the career choices of pharmacists’ children and intergenerational mobility.
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The Pharmacy Market and Public Health
Many studies over the past 40 years have assessed potential health
effects of pharmacist-provided direct patient care services. There is substantial evidence that pharmacist involvement in direct patient care can
have beneficial effects on patient health outcomes (Chisholm-Burns et
al. 2010).
Because community pharmacists are among the most accessible
health care providers, the clinical services they provide can have a major
impact on patient health outcomes. Their access to prescription refill
information and frequent interactions with patients uniquely position
them to help patients adhere to a medicine regimen. This is evidenced
especially in the treatments of Type 2 diabetes (Nazar et al. 2015;
Pousinho et al. 2016), cardiovascular diseases (Altowaijri, Phillips,
and Fitzsimmons 2013; Koshman et al. 2008; Tsuyuki et al. 2016), and
seasonal influenza (Gai and Feng 2017; Kirkdale et al. 2017). However,
as evidenced by the review of Blalock et al. (2013) in the United States,
the effectiveness of pharmacist-provided direct patient care services
delivered in the community setting is more limited than in other settings,
such as hospitals. Only 50 of the 134 outcomes (37.3 percent) examined in the 21 articles that Blalock and colleagues reviewed revealed
between-group differences or changes over time that were consistent
with beneficial intervention effects.
Besides positive impact on health outcomes, density of community
pharmacies is also associated with an increase in drug supply (mainly
OTC medicines), some of which may be abused. Cooper (2013) identifies OTC medicine abuse in many countries together with a range of
other problems. The first is the direct harm caused by the pharmacological or psychological effects of drug abuse or misuse. Although there was
variability across countries, five key groups emerged: codeine-based
(especially compound analgesic) medicines, cough products (particularly dextromethorphan), sedative antihistamines, decongestants, and
laxatives. The second is the physiological harm related to the adverse
effects of a secondary active ingredient in a compound formulation,
causing, for example, upper gastrointestinal bleeding. Both types of
harm led to concerns about overdoses and excessive use of emergency
services. Finally, the literature identified other negative effects, such as
progression to abuse of other substances, economic costs, and effects on
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personal and social life (Cooper 2013). To the best of our knowledge, the
association between community pharmacy density and increased hospitalizations due to medicine abuse has not been systematically explored.

TYPE OF REGULATION
In Italy, most drugs must be distributed through an authorized pharmacy, the main exception being over the counter (OTC) drugs, which
are subject to lighter regulation. The number of pharmacies and their
location is subject to strict regulation determined through an administrative procedure. Each of the 20 Italian regional governments determines
the number of pharmacies in each municipality and their exact location
(minimum distance requirements between pharmacies also apply). The
procedure is complex, and the process also involves city councils, local
health services, and the professional associations of pharmacists. The
size of the population living in each municipality is the main determinant of the number of pharmacies, and the function that maps the local
population to the maximum number of pharmacies in each municipality
is set by law. Since 1968, three such functions have been used.
The first, used between 1968 and 1991, required a maximum of one
pharmacy every 5,000 inhabitants in municipalities with a population
up to 25,000, and one pharmacy every 4,000 inhabitants in larger towns.
In small municipalities, with populations below 25,000, if the remainder obtained dividing the population by 5,000 is larger than 2,500, it is
possible to open an additional pharmacy. In larger towns, the remainder
obtained after having assigned one pharmacy to every 4,000 inhabitants
is ignored. This rather complex requirement generates the step function
with somewhat irregular steps described in Figure 4.1.
The second function, in place between 1991 and 2012, required one
pharmacy for every 5,000 inhabitants in municipalities up to 12,500,
and one pharmacy for every 4,000 in larger towns. The remainder
allows for the opening of a new pharmacy only if it is larger than 50 percent of the population requirement. Broadly speaking, this new function increases the number of pharmacies by decreasing the population
threshold (12,500 instead of 25,000) and by not ignoring the remainders
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Figure 4.1 Number of Pharmacies Allowed in Each Municipality
According to the Demographic Rule
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NOTE: The figure reports the number of pharmacies allowed to operate in each municipality as a function of the local population according to the demographic rule in place
in three different periods.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on laws 475, 1968; 362, 1991; and 27, 2012.

in larger towns. Figure 4.1 compares this new step function with the one
in place between 1968 and 1991.
The third function, introduced in 2012, provides for one pharmacy
every 3,300 inhabitants. As before, the remainder allows for the opening
of a new pharmacy only if it is larger than 50 percent of the population
requirement. This change generates the third step function described in
Figure 4.1. These new rules further increase the number of pharmacies.
In principle, the demographic rules described in Figure 4.1 provide for
a simple rule that links local population to number of pharmacies. However, a number of complications arise in the application of such rules,
which make the link between number of pharmacies and population
much more complex, as shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2 Number of Pharmacies and Population in Italian
Municipalities
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NOTE: The figure shows the number of pharmacies in each Italian municipality and
the local population in 2015, with the three demographic rules used in the 1968–2016
period (see Figure 4.1).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Istat and Italian Ministry of Health,
and laws 475, 1968; 362, 1991; and 27, 2012.

The first issue relates to the municipalities with more pharmacies
than the number set by the demographic rule. This may occur as a result
of the status quo in 1968 or as a consequence of shrinking population
in some municipalities. In absence of a clear indication of which pharmacy is supposed to close, and being generally profitable businesses,
pharmacies in excess of the demographic rule are often allowed to operate. This allows for municipalities with more pharmacies than what the
demographic rule would predict.
The second complication relates to small villages, which may not
be entitled to a pharmacy according to the demographic rule. In rural
areas, the closest pharmacy may prove to be too far away to guarantee
a minimum availability of medicines. Therefore, exceptions to the rule
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are possible, and additional pharmacies can be allowed in small villages
(less than 12,500 inhabitants) in rural areas (but subject to minimum
distance requirements from other pharmacies).
A third concern arises as a consequence of the complex procedure
required to update the list of pharmacies and then to select the pharmacists in charge of each pharmacy (this requires a public competition
subject to specific rules). As a result, years of delay are not uncommon.
Such an inefficient administrative procedure results in municipalities
with fewer pharmacies than what the demographic rule would predict.
In 2016, only a few regions had completed the procedures to update
the list and opened the required new pharmacies (Bocci 2016). Finally,
additional pharmacies may be opened (at most 5 percent of the total)
in locations with large flows of people such as train stations, airports,
and large shopping centers (but subject to specific minimum distance
requirements from other pharmacies).
Each change in regulation was motivated by the desire to increase
the availability of pharmacies. However, as described above, the impact
was delayed because of slow implementation. The reforms took place
during a period in which other attempts to liberalize some professional
service markets also occurred. These were typically opposed by professional associations, and their effects were significantly attenuated with
respect to the initial goals. The most significant example is the so-called
Bersani reform in 2006, which canceled price floors (at the time still in
place for a number of professions) and lifted the ban on commercial
advertising and contingent fees. The market for OTC drugs was also
liberalized, allowing supermarkets to enter into a highly regulated market, in direct competition with pharmacies (see Pagliero [2015] for a
description of these reforms and some evidence on their impact).

QUALITY INDICATORS
As discussed above, pharmacists are considered primary health
care providers—chronically ill patients often ask their pharmacists
about their pathologies, medications, and other needs. For this reason,
pharmacies represent an important factor contributing to the management of chronic diseases. Based on the organization of the Ital-
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ian National Health Care system and clinical characteristics, and for
reasons described below, we select four health outcomes of interest:
1) influenza and influenza-associated complications, including pneumonia; 2) diabetes; 3) acute coronary syndromes, including acute myocardial infarction (AMI); and 4) upper gastrointestinal bleeding.
Influenza
Influenza is characterized by seasonal outbreaks—at least one during
the cold seasons—and its incidence and mortality depend on individualrelated factors (e.g., age, comorbidities, immunocompetence), environmental factors (e.g., low temperatures, time course of the outbreak) and
medical factors (e.g., antiviral treatment) (Huang et al. 2015). The World
Health Organization suggests annual preventive vaccination, especially
for high-risk populations (such as older people, pregnant women, or
immunocompromised hosts). In these subgroups of the population, the
risk of hospital admissions and death for influenza itself or for some of
its complications (e.g., viral pneumonia, bacterial co-infection, or respiratory failure) is higher than in the general population. We chose influenza for one of the four outcomes of interest because it is characterized
by an acute seasonal outbreak, and vaccination and the availability of
pharmacies can have an impact on hospital admissions and mortality.
Diabetes
The prevalence of diabetes, a chronic syndrome, is increasing
among all ages. Without proper management, over time diabetes can
cause cardiovascular, renal, neural, and ocular damage. For this reason,
the World Health Organization suggests several preventive strategies,
but if a diagnosis is confirmed, it is essential to obtain a tight control of
blood sugar through diet and pharmacological approaches. The number
and the density of pharmacies can influence both blood sugar level testing and adherence to therapy.
Coronary Syndromes
The coronary syndromes are chronic diseases with multiple possible acute recurrences. The definition of coronary syndrome is wide and
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is related to all coronary heart diseases that cause frequent and lethal
acute manifestations, such as myocardial infarction and heart failure.
Coronary diseases have a different development than diabetes. Their
first manifestation could be more frequently lethal. For this reason, the
prevention of these acute events is a cornerstone of the management
suggested by the World Health Organization. It is based on diet, physical activity, smoking cessation, and blood pressure control. The first
three preventive actions are the goal of global public health strategies,
based on awareness campaigns, but community pharmacies could contribute to the prevention and effective treatment of hypertension. Pharmacies play a role in facilitating both adherence to treatment and blood
pressure monitoring. They also distribute lipid-lowering medications,
for which adherence is a well-known problem.
Upper Gastrointestinal Bleeding
Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, the most widely used painkillers, may increase the risk of upper gastrointestinal bleeding in
absence of a correct preventive strategy. Access to pharmacies may
affect overuse of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, thus increasing
the risk of upper gastrointestinal bleeding. On the other hand, it can
also help increase adherence to therapy with proton pump inhibitors, as
well as with some H2 antagonists, which treat, among other ailments,
stomach ulcers and acid reflux. These drugs are some of the most used
worldwide, with a long-term indication, and may prevent bleeding due
to the long-term use of painkillers.

DATA SOURCES
For the analysis based on the municipality-level data (described
below), we obtained the total number of admissions/hospital discharge
records aggregated by sex, age class, municipality, and calendar year
for selected causes of hospital admission over the period 2000–2015.
Hospital discharge records contain details about the main and secondary discharge diagnoses, the implemented operations, and clinical discharge information.5 For the analysis based on province-level data (also
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described below), we obtained data from the Health for All database
(HFA).6 The HFA database, maintained by the World Health Organization, brings together selected indicators on demographics, health status, health determinants, and risk factors at the national or subnational
level.7 To obtain province-specific measures of mortality and admission
rates, we averaged the yearly rates for five years (2010–2014 for mortality and 2011–2015 for admissions).8
This section illustrates the results of two different approaches to
estimating the impact of the availability of pharmacies on health outcomes. The first uses cross-sectional data on Italian provinces to examine the demographic rule that links the number of pharmacies to the
population size in each city. This variability in pharmacies per capita
across provinces can be used to estimate the effect of interest. The second approach uses city-level data and the specific nature of the demographic rule, which provides for sharp steps, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The Number of Pharmacies in Italian Municipalities
Our data set includes the number, exact location, date of first opening, and changes of ownership of pharmacies in each municipality (the
Italian government collects the data for administrative reasons).9 The
data set includes observations for 7,948 municipalities.10 As a result
of the demographic rule, the number of pharmacies is linked, although
imperfectly, with the local population. This is shown clearly in Figure
4.2, which reports the number of pharmacies in each Italian municipality and the local population in 2015. Still, there are deviations from the
demographic rule, which are particularly frequent in small municipalities (with less than 12,500 inhabitants). For these towns and villages
in rural areas, the constraint imposed by the demographic rule is not
binding, and the number of pharmacies is systematically higher than the
values predicted by the demographic rule. However, in larger cities, it is
not uncommon to observe fewer pharmacies than the predicted number.
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics. On average, municipalities
have just 2.2 pharmacies, reflecting the small size of most Italian municipalities. Only 5 percent of municipalities have 6 or more pharmacies.
About 14 percent have no pharmacies. The number of inhabitants per
pharmacy varies across municipalities. The average is 2,808, but there
is significant variability. About 50 percent of municipalities have fewer

62 Pagano et al.
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics on the Number of Pharmacies in Italian
Municipalities
Variable
Mean S.d.
N
Number of
7,948 2.22 11.78
pharmacies
Inhabitants/
6,834 2,808 1,697
number of
pharmacies

p5
0

p10
0

p25
1

p50
1

p75
2

p90
4

p95
6

569

784 1,383 2,585 3,995 5,032 5,845

NOTE: The table reports the number of observations, the mean, standard deviation
(S.d.), and percentiles (5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th) of the distribution
of each variable (2015).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Istat and Italian Ministry of Health.

than 2,585 inhabitants for each pharmacy. About 25 percent have more
than 4,000. This illustrates the effects of the delays in implementing the
2012 reform, which set a target of 3,300 inhabitants for each pharmacy.
Results from Data at the Province Level
When using the 2010 population as the denominator, the mean
observed density of pharmacies by province was 3.04 per 10,000 inhabitants, with a range of 2.16 and 6.30 per 10,000 inhabitants, while the
mean expected density of pharmacies was 2.85 per 10,000 inhabitants
with a range between 2.28 and 6.53 per 10,000 inhabitants. Thus, both
densities varied widely over provinces.11 Both the observed and the
expected densities depend on the distribution of the population size
of the municipalities within each province. This is depicted in Figure
4.3, in which observed and expected densities are plotted against the
province-specific median population size of municipalities. The median
population size explained 31 percent of the variation in expected pharmacies and 27 percent of the variation in observed pharmacies.
The age-standardized admission rates per 10,000 inhabitants for
the period 2011–2015 was between 28.5 and 144.4 for influenza/pneumonia, 45.1 and 120.4 for AMI, and 5.3 and 60.5 for diabetes. Figure
4.4 shows maps with province- and gender-specific age-standardized
admission rates for the three outcomes of interest.
While for influenza/pneumonia there was a clear north-south gradient, the rates for the other two outcomes did not follow straightforward
geographical patterns. Table 4.2 summarizes the results of the regres-
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Figure 4.3 Province-Specific Observed and Expected Densities of
Pharmacies by Median Municipality Population
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Istat and Italian Ministry of Health.

sion models carried out to estimate the association between observed/
expected densities of pharmacies and age-standardized admission or
mortality rates of influenza/pneumonia, AMI, and diabetes.12 Estimates
reported in the table should be interpreted as the estimated increase or
decrease in admission or mortality rates by a unit increase in expected
or observed province density of pharmacies (i.e., an increase in 1 pharmacy per 10,000 inhabitants). For example, the coefficient of –8.7 in the
upper left corner of the table implies an estimated decrease of 8.7 per
10,000 in the age-standardized rate of influenza/pneumonia admissions
associated with an increase of 1 per 10,000 inhabitants in the observed
number of pharmacies.
The adjusted estimates account for other determinants of the three
outcomes of interest, namely urbanization level, macro geographical
area (North, Central, and South Italy) and educational level. For both
the observed and the expected density of pharmacies, we also conducted
a sensitivity analysis, restricting the sample to provinces with less than
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Figure 4.4 Gender-Specific and Age-Standardized Admission Rates
(per 10,000 inhabitants) for Influenza/Pneumonia, Acute
Myocardial Infarction (AMI) and Diabetes, by Italian
Provinces, 2013
Influenza/Pneumonia, Males, 65+
Mean: 87.5 per 10,000 inhabitants

Influenza/Pneumonia, Females, 65+
Mean: 45.5 per 10,000 inhabitants

AMI, Males, 65+
Mean: 80.8 per 10,000 inhabitants

AMI, Females, 65+
Mean: 39.5 per 10,000 inhabitants
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Figure 4.4 (continued)
Diabetes, Males, 45+
Mean: 17.1 per 10,000 inhabitants

Diabetes, Females, 45+
Mean: 10.2 per 10,000 inhabitants

NOTE: Shades indicate quintiles, where the darkest shade corresponds to the highest rate.
SOURCE: Health for All database.

1,000,000 inhabitants. This analysis aimed at checking that our results
were not biased by the contribution of large cities in which the access
to pharmacies and their density may be different compared to the rest
of the country.
It should be noted that geographical patterns associated with both
the density of pharmacies and the rates of hospitalization or death could
hide or emphasize the estimated associations. Overall, we find no evidence of association between the observed or expected density of pharmacies and admission rates for AMI and diabetes. There is an inverse
association between the observed density of pharmacies and admission
rates of influenza/pneumonia, although this association was strongly
attenuated in the analysis on the expected density of pharmacy. We find
no evidence of association with mortality for influenza/pneumonia,
AMI, or diabetes for the observed or for the expected density of pharmacies. Results from the analyses restricted to provinces with a popula-

66 Pagano et al.
Table 4.2 Association of Observed and Expected Densities of Pharmacies
with Admission and Mortality Rates of Influenza/Pneumonia,
Acute Myocardial Infarction and Diabetes
Density of
Acute myocardial
pharmacies Influenza/pneumonia
infarction
Diabetes
Admission Mortality Admission Mortality Admission Mortality
rates
rates
rates
rates
rates
rates
Observed density of pharmacies
Crude
−8.66*** −0.68*
−0.52
1.24
−0.12
0.14
(2.96)
(0.38)
(1.95)
(0.98)
(0.99)
(0.77)
R2
0.069
0.031
0.001
0.016
< 0.001
< 0.001
Adjusted
−8.47***
−0.33
−0.20
1.06
−0.45
−0.33
coefficienta
(2.53)
(0.24)
(2.08)
(1.01)
(0.99)
(0.39)
R2
0.443
0.669
0.057
0.138
0.165
0.787
Adjusted and −8.52***
−0.29
−0.38
1.11
−0.16
−0.23
restricted
(2.62)
(0.26)
(2.25)
(0.93)
(1.01)
(0.40)
coefficienta
R2
0.440
0.643
0.052
0.148
0.148
0.764
Crude
R2
Adjusted
coefficienta
R2
Adjusted and
restricted
coefficienta
R2

0.72
(2.02)
0.001
−2.89
(1.76)
0.395
−2.72
(1.80)
0.388

Expected density of pharmaciesb
0.42*
−1.92
−0.84
(0.25)
(1.26)
(0.64)
0.028
0.002
0.017
0.02
−1.63
−0.15
(0.16)
(1.38)
(0.68)
0.663
0.070
0.129
0.02
−1.73
−0.24
(0.17)
(1.47)
(0.62)
0.638

0.070

0.136

−0.62
(0.65)
0.009
−0.31
(0.67)
0.165
−0.33
(−0.66)

−1.08
(0.49)
0.046
−0.24
(0.26)
0.787
−0.29
(0.26)

0.150

0.766

Adjusted for proportion of population living in areas with low urbanization, macro
geographical area, proportion of the population with high educational level; restricted
to provinces with less than 1,000,000 inhabitants..
b
Based on the 1991 legislation.
NOTE: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at
the 0.01 level. Based on 102 provinces; 92 provinces in the restricted analyses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Istat, Health for All, and Italian
Ministry of Health.

a
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tion size lower than 1,000,000 are consistent with the results carried out
on all provinces, with no evidence of bias introduced by large cities.
Results from Data at Municipality Level
Data at the municipality level were used to exploit the arbitrary
values taken by a specific step of the demographic rule described in
Figure 4.1. We focus on one specific step in the demographic rule (at
7,500 inhabitants) for the 2005–2011 period. This choice is motivated
by the fact that the step has not changed since the introduction of this
type of regulation in the 1960s, which allows us to explore the longrun effects of the regulation. Moreover, most Italian municipalities
are small, which implies that there are many observations around the
threshold. We select 1,214 municipalities with populations between
5,000 and 10,000, creating a symmetric window (±2,500) around the
step and merge data on the number and location of each pharmacy in
each municipality with data from hospital discharges.13 This is a relatively homogeneous sample of small towns and villages. On average,
municipalities in this sample have 1.7 pharmacies. Hence, the opening
of one pharmacy can potentially make a difference for consumers.
Table 4.3 reports the average number of admissions and the average number of pharmacies in the sample. Figure 4.5 reports the average
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics for Number of Yearly Admissions for the
Selected Health Outcomes and Number of Pharmacies
Variable
Mean
S.d.
Min
Max
Upper gastrointestinal bleeding
3.52
2.46
0
26
Coronary diseases
21.28
10.02
0
80
Diabetes
0.49
1.16
0
45
Influenza
15.29
9.43
0
77
Number of pharmacies
1.78
0.67
0
5
Number of pharmacies according to
1.35
0.47
1
2
the demographic rule
Observations
8,498
NOTE: Each observation corresponds to one city in one municipality in one year in the
2005–2011 period.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Istat, Health for All, and Italian
Ministry of Health.
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Figure 4.5 Average Number of Pharmacies and Population
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NOTE: The figure reports the average number of pharmacies in municipalities of different size according to historical population (intervals of 100 inhabitants). The lines
are the fitted values of a linear regression of number of pharmacies on population on
each sides of the 7,500 threshold, which corresponds to an increase from one to two
pharmacies according to the demographic rule in place until 2011.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Istat, Health for All, and Italian
Ministry of Health.

number of pharmacies for municipalities of different size. Each dot in
the figure corresponds to the average number of pharmacies in a specific interval of 100 between 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants. The lines on
both sides of the vertical line are the fitted values of a linear regression
on each side of the 7,500 threshold (vertical line), which corresponds to
an increase from one to two pharmacies according to the demographic
rule. The discontinuity at the threshold corresponds to a 0.28 increase
in the number of pharmacies.14 This is in line with the fact that regulation induces an increase in the number of pharmacies at the threshold,
although other variables may also influence the observed number of
pharmacies.
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Figure 4.6 Average Number of Influenza Admissions and Population
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NOTE: The figure reports the average number of influenza admissions in municipalities
of different size according to historical population (intervals of 100 inhabitants). The
lines are the fitted values of a linear regression of number of admissions on population
on each sides of the 7,500 thresholds, which corresponds to an increase from one to
two pharmacies according to the demographic rule in place until 2011.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from Istat, Health for All, and Italian
Ministry of Health.

Figure 4.6 shows the corresponding results for the average number
of influenza admissions. In this case, there is a negative jump at the
threshold of 2.1 cases (statistically significant at 5 percent confidence
level). Hence, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 suggest that the increase in the number of pharmacies caused by the threshold is associated with a significant decrease in the number of influenza admissions. The magnitude of
the effect is sizable. An increase in the average number of pharmacies
of 0.28 (as in Figure 4.5) corresponds to a drop of about 2.1 in the
average number of hospital admissions. Hence, a 16 percent increase
in the number of pharmacies corresponds to a 13 percent reduction in
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the average number of influenza related admissions. We find no similar
effects for the other health outcomes.
In conclusion, this approach focuses on a subsample of small
municipalities in which about half are above and below the threshold.
The threshold remained in place for a long time and provides for a relatively large increase in the availability of pharmacies. Hence, the results
suggest the existence of a negative long-run effect of the availability of
pharmacies on the number of hospital admissions related to influenza.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR POLICY
This case study examined the impact of regulation on the number
and location of pharmacies in Italy and its potential effects on human
health. We used health outcomes measures from hospital admission
records that can potentially capture the impact of access to medicines
(and the other services provided in pharmacies) on the health of the
population.
The results from the analysis at the province level support the
hypothesis of an inverse association between density of pharmacies and
admission rates of influenza. Results using municipality-level data provide complementary and potentially more valid evidence, as they are
biased to a lesser extent by geographical confounding. These results are
consistent with the results obtained from the analysis of the data at the
province level and suggest a long-run effect of pharmacy availability
on consumer health. In either analytical approach we find no evidence
of association between the density of pharmacies and admission rates
for AMI and diabetes or upper gastrointestinal bleeding as a marker of
potential negative effects of an increased number of pharmacies.
Overall, the results provide the first evidence on how regulation of
the market for pharmacies might affect service availability (a crucial
determinant of quality in this market) and consumer health. While these
are promising results, they should be interpreted with care. Longer time
series could be used in future research to detect the dynamic effects
of the availability of pharmacies. Regression discontinuity designs can
capture the long-run effects, but they provide results that are difficult
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to extrapolate out of the sample, as these techniques focus on a very
specific sample.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that restrictions to
the number of pharmacies might negatively affect health outcomes of
the population. Increasing availability of pharmacies may not only have
positive economic effects (e.g., lower prices for unregulated products)
but also positive health effects. Guaranteeing a sufficient availability of
pharmacies in rural areas may be difficult due to the low profitability
of these markets. However, direct subsidies to rural pharmacies seem
to be a better policy option than entry restrictions over the entire range
of market size. Although strict regulation of the pharmacy market can
be justified by the possible dangers associated with the improper use of
medicine, it is important to consider the specific effects of entry regulation separately from the regulation of the use and prescription of drugs.
We did not find an association between increased competition in the
pharmacy market and decreased safety standards, at least in terms of
the measured side effects of drugs. To the contrary, the availability of
pharmacies and competent pharmacists might have positive effects on
health.
Notes
1. Unfortunately, Italy is among the countries not included in the analysis.
2. In 2005, England revised its “control of entry test” system. In 2002, Ireland
revoked the rules for the opening of new pharmacies, and in 1998, the Netherlands
abolished restrictions on the establishment of new pharmacies. Norway deregulated in 2001, and Sweden, in 2009, ended the monopoly of the state-owned pharmacy company, owner of all pharmacies.
3. The market was subject to a modest liberalization in 2006, when para-pharmacies
and supermarkets were allowed to enter the market and sell OTC drugs. The new
regulations were introduced by decree-law at the end of June 2006 and converted
into law by the Italian parliament at the beginning of August.
4. Attending physicians are not allowed to distribute drugs.
5. The Italian health care system is a regionally based national health service that
provides free universal coverage at the point of service. Providers are paid for their
activities by means of a prospective payment system based on diagnosis related
groups. In order to allocate each patient to a specific diagnosis related group, the
Italian Ministry of Health has implemented the hospital discharge records (HDRs)
system at a national scale (Ferrè et al. 2014). Hospital discharge records are used
to collect information about individual patients such as inpatient data, details of
implemented therapies/operations, and clinical discharge information. Hospital
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6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

14.

discharge record collection is mandatory, and includes both ordinary and outpatient admissions (day hospital). The records are first collected at the regional level
and then forwarded to the Italian Ministry of Health.
The HFA database is accessible through the website of the National Institute of
Statistics (ISTAT) at the following address: https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/14562
(accessed June 22, 2022).
Specifically, the data on hospital admissions is provided by ISTAT based on HDR
data. ISTAT is also responsible for the collection and coding of mortality data at
the national level.
The analysis was limited to a five-year period because the boundaries and number of Italian provinces have changed over time, and a longer period time would
have implied a restriction to a smaller number of provinces. In our analysis, we
excluded only data for the Sardinia region, which includes a small proportion of
the Italian population (less than 3 percent).
Italian Ministry of Health, http://www.dati.salute.gov.it (accessed December 13,
2021).
We exclude a few municipalities that were created after 2006 or changed name
during the same period. We also exclude temporary points of sale (e.g., open only
in summer in tourist areas) or smaller branches of authorized pharmacies (e.g.,
open in tourist areas and/or in specific periods), which are not subject to the demographic rule.
The correlation coefficient between observed and expected densities is 0.71.
The table reports the estimated regression coefficient of pharmacy density, its standard error, and the regression R2.
In the regression discontinuity analysis, we use the maximum historical population method proposed by Calzolari et al. (2013). In practice, the discontinuity is
based on the maximum population in the 1971–2001 period instead of current
population to account for the fact that the number of pharmacies does not adjust
downward when the population shrinks. See Calzolari et al. (2013) for a detailed
discussion of this method.
Statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level.
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INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
In 2004 and 2005, Poland deregulated access to the legal professions. This provides an interesting case study of the effect of reforms
that aim to lower the barriers to entry to the legal market. Professional
conduct and adequate qualification are often the product of institutional
incentives. Regulation of legal services, such as representation before
court or a counsel, hinges on lawyers as service providers and their
group representation, such as bar associations. Lowering barriers to
entry to the profession naturally raises questions about whether that
affects the quality of legal service; therefore, a key question we seek
to answer is whether such reforms negatively affected service quality.
Public interest in the regulation of legal services rests on the idea
that the work of legal professionals is inexorably linked to the effectiveness of the administration of justice, administrative procedures, quality
of law, social ties, and general trust toward the state and the law (Boon
2014). Smooth functioning of the market for legal services can be hampered by the asymmetry of information, negative externalities, and the
collective action problem (Decker and Yarrow 2010). State regulation
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has traditionally counterbalanced the promotion of the collective interests of lawyers as put forth by their bar associations.

REGULATORY CONTEXT
The regulatory regime for any occupational group consists of rules
that define entry to the profession and are complemented by rules of
conduct, both of which have an economic impact. For instance, the
scope of exclusive rights or legal protection of a professional title determines the value of economic rents the practitioners can extract.
In Poland, legal trainees are required to obtain a law degree, which
takes five years to complete. Because most trainees graduate from public universities, the cost of their higher education is covered by the state.
Subsequently, they decide whether they want to pursue a career as a
qualified lawyer. If they decide to follow such a path, they are required
to enroll in a bar training course organized by one of the two major legal
professions in the country: advocates (adwokaci) or legal advisors (radcowie prawni) (both professions suggest that their professional titles
are translated into English as attorney-at-law). Until 2009, bar training
took three and a half years; after the reform, it was three years. Upon
completion of the bar training, candidates are expected to take the bar
exam, which, upon passing, entitles them to the professional title of an
advocate or a legal advisor. Following the completion of the mandatory education, training, and examinations, freshman lawyers must purchase membership to the bar association and civil liability insurance,
and they have to participate in continuous professional development.
Since 2004, when the legal professions lost monopoly on legal services,
the law graduates can also become so-called legal counselors (doradcy
prawni), that is, lawyers who render legal services without formal bar
training or having passed the bar exam.
Before 2004, only advocates were eligible to provide all types of
legal services (including legal counsel), and any violations might have
resulted in criminal charges. Legal advisors were not allowed to assume
any family, custody, and delinquency cases. These and other similar
market constraints were partially lifted during the economic and political transition in Poland in the 1990s and early 2000s. Exclusive rights
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of advocates and legal advisors to provide legal counsel were abolished,
while exclusive rights of advocates to provide representation in court
were significantly reduced. As a result, starting in 2004 all members of
the general public are allowed to provide some forms of legal counsel,
such as draft legal documents, give legal advice, or represent a party in
front of a first-instance civil court. This change attracted new entrants,
mostly legal counselors, who are lawyers without a professional title.
Other amendments soon followed suit. After the transition to a market economy, legal education in the 1990s started to attract many students. However, despite completing a law degree, restrictions on the
number of bar trainee positions, nepotism, and difficulty in attending
examinations in various local bar locations prevented many graduates
from becoming qualified lawyers. To illustrate this, between 1999 and
2003, each year the number of law graduates exceeded 7,000, whereas
the number of accepted trainees to advocate and legal advisor bar
remained below 1,000. Consequently, a vast majority of law graduates became disconnected from their profession. This situation created
political pressure for a change. The conditions became favorable when
in 2004 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal pronounced a judgment
requesting a change in the rules of entry to the profession (prerequisites and selection criteria), and the provisions limiting the number of
trainees were deemed unconstitutional. In response, a new law in 2005
required the Ministry of Justice and the bar associations to jointly organize standardized annual exams to the bar training and to guarantee
access to the profession for all applicants scoring above a predefined
passing threshold. Starting in 2010, trainees had to take a state exam
to verify that they acquired sufficient knowledge and skills to deal with
most common legal tasks, such as preparing an appeal to a court ruling
or drafting a contract or a legal opinion. Minor amendments to these
so-called advocate and legal advisor exams were introduced in 2013.
Another development was the delineation of new paths to legal professions. These paths allowed for circumventing bar training for those
lawyers who were able to gain enough professional experience without
bar training. Additionally, PhD degree holders in law and some other
groups of legal professionals such as judges or prosecutors, who had
sufficient, four-year legal experience, became eligible to enlist as advocates or legal advisors without the requirement to pass the final exam.
These new paths to the profession deprived the bar associations of full
control over the process of admission.
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All amendments that came along with new regulations raised
doubts about the level of professionalism of advocates and legal advisors admitted under the new rules. Additionally, questions were raised
regarding unfair competition between qualified and nonqualified legal
service practitioners. Licensing was practically abolished for most of
the legal services in the market, and it was not substituted by certification or registration. The monolith group of lawyers rendering their
services to the market began to be composed of at least four subgroups:
1) older advocates and legal advisors who made it to the profession
before the reforms; 2) a younger generation of lawyers who underwent
the bar training having passed the state exams instead of bar exams;
3) advocates and legal advisors who did not attend a bar training at
all, working previously as, for instance, prosecutors or legal academics; and 4) practitioners who entered the market but not the profession
(usually holding just a law degree). In practice, the fourth subgroup
turned out to be relatively small and entered only some profitable segments of the market such as debt collection or injury compensation. The
academics and other legal professionals who gained the right to provide
legal services entered in modest numbers. Overall, the reform raised
the question of whether a constantly growing number of new practitioners (group 2) acts more professionally than the group of lawyers who
gained their credentials before the reform (group 1). Evidence from
Japan shows that the liberalization of rules of entry to the profession led
to a deterioration in the quality of legal services and subsequent loss of
public trust in lawyers, but the effect was shown to come from the conduct of the elder members of the profession and the new entrants (Ishida
2017; Ota 2014). To this end, this chapter investigates the effects of the
reforms on various service quality indicators and analyzes the functioning of the market for legal services at the onset of reforms.

IMPACT OF REFORMS ON PRACTITIONERS IN
THE MARKET
Prior to the reforms, only advocates had full rights to representation
before the courts. After the reforms, those rights were gradually shared
with legal advisors, and the entry of external lawyers (with their creden-

Deregulation of the Legal Professions in Poland 79

tials not verified by bars) became easier. The main focus of the reforms,
however, was the bar training. They abolished quotas and introduced
nationally standardized examinations, the same for both professions,
which aimed at guaranteeing that fulfilment of objective criteria was
sufficient to enter the profession. As shown in Tables 5.1–5.3, these
changes alone caused a significant inflow of trainees to professional
training and subsequently translated into a higher number of advocates
and legal advisors. More candidates passed a predefined, standardized
threshold on the exam and were accepted to the respective bars, as
either advocates or legal advisor trainees.
Overall, the average pass rates increased when the state took over
the supervision over the entrance exams (Table 5.1). The number of
candidates increased, as did the number of law graduates entering the
bar training.
Table 5.1 Pass Rates and the Number of Successful Candidates before
and after the Introduction of the New Entrance Examinations
to the Bar Training in 2005
2000–2004 2005–2017
Average pass rate (%), entrance exam for
31.6
49.1
advocate training
Average pass rate (%), entrance exam for legal
26.9
41.3
advisor training
Average number of candidates who passed the
293
1,583
examinations for advocate trainee
Average number of candidates who passed the
760
2,307
examinations for legal advisor trainee
SOURCE: Polish Ministry of Justice.

Data from the Polish Ministry of Justice show the number of candidates for an advocate trainee or a legal advisor trainee who passed their
entrance exams under the new regulations in December 2005 (1,822
out of 4,526—40 percent on average). These candidates began their
training in 2006 and subsequently sat new professional examinations in
mid-2010. A total of 1,423 out of 2,086 (68 percent) passed these exams
and enlisted as advocates or legal advisors by the end of 2010. Other
cohorts followed. Thus, after 2011 the full effects of the 2005 reform
could have been observed.
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Table 5.2 Number of Lawyers Who Passed the Professional Examinations
with or without Prior Bar Training in 2009–2015
With prior
Without prior
Number of candidates taking:
bar training
bar training
Total
Advocate examination
6,953
354
7,307
Legal advisor examination
12,383
925
13,308
Total
19,336
1,279
20,615
NOTE: In December 2009 only lawyers without prior bar training could seat professional examinations.
SOURCE: Polish Ministry of Justice.

Average pass rates for both the advocate and legal advisor exams
stood at 71 percent (data for 2009–2017). Multiplied by the pass rates
for the new entrance exams to the bar training, they provide approximate chances for a law graduate to become (four years later) an advocate or legal advisor: 35 percent for the candidates for advocates and 29
percent for the candidates for legal advisors.1
Furthermore, as a result of the reform, some candidates were
exempted from the bar training and some from the professional examinations. The exemption from the bar training opened a path to both
professions for 1,279 nontrainees who passed the professional examinations (from the first professional examinations in 2009 to 2015). They
account for 6 percent of the total number of lawyers who passed the
professional examinations.
An even larger number of lawyers (4,559) benefited from the second
exemption, namely being exempted from both the bar training and the
professional examinations. They account for 15 percent of the total registered advocates and legal advisors between 2009 and 2015 (Table 5.3).
Table 5.3 Number of Entries into the Registries of Advocates and Legal
Advisors with and without a Prior Professional Examination
in 2007–2015
Number of entries
With prior
Without prior
into the registry of:
professional exam
professional exam
Total
Advocates
8,623
2,208
10,831
Legal advisors
16,538
2,351
18,889
Total
25,161
4,559
29,720
SOURCE: Polish Ministry of Justice.
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In 2020, lawyers who obtained their professional title according
to the amended, more transparent rules constituted around half of the
total number of advocates and legal advisors in Poland (35,200 out of
around 70,000). The total number of legal professionals (advocates and
legal advisors) rose by 140 percent between 2005 and 2020. The number of practicing advocates increased from 6,191 to around 20,400, and
that of legal advisors rose from 17,501 to 35,200. At the same time the
number of advocates and legal advisors who had the professional title
but did not practice increased substantially—from 6,600 by the end of
2004 to around 12,000 by the end of 2017. It is a heterogeneous group,
comprised mostly of retired legal professionals, advocates who choose
inactivity (such as parents on maternity/paternity leave; advocates cannot provide their services under an employment contract), or those who
are not satisfied with their income and decide to follow a different professional path.
To this number one should add at least 5,000 unqualified lawyers
(legal counselors) who opened up their businesses since 2004, when the
monopoly of advocates and legal advisors in legal services was relaxed.
Additionally, it should include an unspecified number of law graduates
and other employees who managed to find a job in newly forming law
firms. Widening the supply of legal services (measured by the number
of practitioners) threefold—from 23,000 in 2004 to at least 60,000 in
2020—within the 15-year period is a significant achievement of the
reforms. Its main social value lies in ensuring broader access to law for
the society. More transparent exams as well as the exemptions stimulated higher interest in legal professions. Regulatory reforms allowed
for a more efficient use of qualified labor.

DIMENSIONS AND MEASUREMENT OF QUALITY IN
LEGAL SERVICES
Services in general, and legal services in particular, have three defining attributes: they are relatively intangible, they tend to be produced
and consumed simultaneously, and they tend to involve the consumer
in the production process (Stewart, Hope, and Muhlemann 2000). Service quality is multidimensional. These dimensions, according to Para-
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suraman et al. (1988), are reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and
empathy. The same applies to legal services. Empirical studies show
importance of professional skills, marketing skills, reputation, and
ethics for the success of legal professionals (Bialowolski and WeziakBialowolska 2021). Good quality legal service encompasses, among
other things, availability of a lawyer (e.g., having offices open at hours
convenient to clients or communicating with the customer on the telephone, email, and SMS), using clear and understandable language in
the communication with a client, and setting out and adhering to clear
pricing rules. Professional legal service is correlated with a greater likelihood of recovering disputed amounts of money and increasing the
amount recovered (Ross 1980), a higher probability of winning a case
in a trial (Hirshleifer and Osborne 2001), and better ability to collect
information that matters, especially in common law jurisdictions where
courts have less inquisitorial power than in civil law systems (Dewatripont and Tirole 1999).
Quality of legal services is inherently linked to the professionalism
of the legal service providers (Boon 2010). This is demonstrated by the
mere size of the codes of ethics in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct published by the American Bar Association (2018), which is hundreds of pages. Professional codes of conduct and deontology specify
the principles and sometimes precise rules lawyers are required to follow. Qualified lawyers and members of the bar are expected to be competent, conscientious, diligent, honest, and prompt, and to respect rules
of confidentiality or to act in an efficient manner. The codes govern four
types of relations of a lawyer: with a client, with court and offices, with
other lawyers, and with the bar or law society authorities (Boon 2014).
Lawyers usually tend to imply that “high quality” is an absolute
that requires a service provider to be professionally qualified (Mayson 2016). However, high-quality service usually entails higher price,
which excludes lower-income groups from consumption and lowers the
value of service for the customers. A more comprehensive and commonly used approach consists then in defining quality in services as
the “perceived service quality” by consumers, conceptualized as the
gap between customer expectations and their evaluations of the performance of a particular service provider (Brady and Cronin 2001; Buttle
1996; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985, 1988).
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Consequently, measuring the quality of legal services may be conducted with the use of various instruments, including the opinions of
customers, opinions of the peers and judges, indicators of substitution
effects (e.g., replacing legal service with self-help), or indicators of the
objective effects of the legal work (outcome). Other measurement tools
include civil liability insurance premia (supposedly lower with highquality legal services), results of negligence suits against lawyers and
peer inspections in law firms (the bar verifies compliance of legal practices with some pre-defined standards), opinions of recruitment specialists (capable of identifying patterns in training and experience), or
comparison of the technical requirements for lawyer candidates they
have to face during bar exams (Masior 2017).
In this chapter, we use the following measures of quality: opinions
of customers as expressed in the complaints they file, and opinions of
the peers under the form of the procedural decisions they take in the
administration of disciplinary matters in the bar associations. We find
these measures to be particularly suitable for capturing low-quality legal
services as complaints are filed, and the disciplinary proceedings are
usually initiated as a reaction to perceived low-quality service.2 Thus,
we aim to take into account both the perspective of consumers, who
usually focus on the soft skills of a lawyer—the facet of service easy for
them to perceive—and technical knowledgeability of lawyers and their
overall professionalism, as assessed by their peers, who usually check
whether they adhered to law and to the rules of professional conduct.

DATA AND METHODS
Following the approach proposed by Ishida (2017), we investigate
the number of reported complaints and disciplinary cases. To this end,
we use the data gathered by the Polish Bar Council and the National
Chamber of Legal Advisors, supreme bodies of the Polish bar associations. The Polish Bar Council has been providing summary reports since
1992 containing the relevant quality measures assessed over three-year
periods corresponding to the term in office of advocates’ representatives.3 Because of the lack of earlier data, the analysis was limited to
2010–2016.
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Authorized and obliged by law, self-governing bodies (such as the
bar associations) control professional conduct of their members (advocates, legal advisors, and trainees); examine complaints filed against
their members; and, if necessary, hold them accountable for any violation of the rules of conduct. Rules of ethics are specified in the resolutions of the respective authorities of the bar associations. Codes of ethics regulate legal practice and relations with clients, courts, colleagues,
and legal authorities. As such, we proxy the quality of legal services
using the frequency and structure of wrongdoings committed by legal
professionals. The data include reported breaches of rules of conduct as
defined by the lawyers themselves.
Both the district bar councils of advocates and the district chambers
of legal advisors handle the cases filed against their members. The cases
are investigated by district disciplinary prosecutors and their deputies.
Disciplinary prosecutors can file charges to a district disciplinary court
(specifically, a request to initiate a disciplinary proceeding) against a
member of the bar. If a peer advocate, legal advisor, or a trainee is found
guilty, she can appeal to the Higher Disciplinary Court. All disciplinary courts are administered solely by lawyers who are members of the
respective bar association.
The data on disciplinary cases describe the consecutive steps of the
procedure. We interpret them as follows: should the number of cases
exhibit a downward or stable trend as the effects of the reforms were
unfolding after 2005 and particularly after 2010 (when newly selected
advocates and legal advisors started to obtain the professional title), it
would support the hypothesis that lowering the entry requirements did
not negatively affect the quality of legal services.
Comparing complaint rates is a common method used to assess the
quality of professional services under a number of regulatory regimes.
The number of complaints depends on the extent to which a given population is litigious (Kleiner 2006) and on the awareness of legal rights
to file complaints with the regulatory body. Filing a complaint is usually
a first step in initiating a negligence suit against a member of the profession. It is also the only practical mechanism that allows customers to
express their dissatisfaction with the service, even if a practitioner did
his work diligently in technical legal terms.
In Poland, clients dissatisfied with the service they received have
a right to complain to the bar about their legal representative. In the
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advocates’ bar association, the complaints are addressed in the so-called
bureaus of complaints, which decide whether there is any sign of a violation of the professional conduct, and if so, pass the pending cases to
a disciplinary prosecutor for investigation. In the legal advisors’ bar
association, a complaint is handled directly by a disciplinary prosecutor
who decides whether to initiate a disciplinary investigation.

IMPACT OF THE REGULATIONS ON THE
PROFESSIONALISM OF LAWYERS
Advocates
Complaints or notifications of improper professional conduct are
filed by both the lawyers’ clients and also the courts, public administration, authorities of the bar, the Ministry of Justice, or other members of
the bar (often an opposing party in a legal dispute).4
The number of complaints filed against practicing advocates (calculated relative to their number) and the number of cases with identified breaches of the rules of professional conduct show that the discontent about the advocates’ performance gradually declined between
2004 and 2016 across all sorts of complainants (Figure 5.1). Judges and
clerks in the public administration were less likely to complain against
advocates, and this trend was also observed among clients. During
2013–2016, the last reporting period, 7,100 complaints were filed to 24
district bar councils, which translates to 0.5 complaints per practicing
advocate over the three-year period (or 0.16 per advocate per year).
Overall, the complaints are rarely filed against advocates.
Figure 5.2 shows that the frequency of the most common allegation, a breach of professional duties, fell by two-thirds following the
reforms that opened the profession to newcomers. Although the distinction between the categories of allegations is decided subjectively by
the bar associations and may not be rigorously respected, the professional duties usually describe the procedural obligations, such as meeting deadlines or participating in hearings. They can relate also to the
conduct of the legal business, such as office equipment and signboard,
records of cases and financial information, cases assigned by courts,

86 Bialowolski and Masior
Figure 5.1 Complaints against Advocates Filed in All District Bar
Councils of Advocates (per practicing advocate)
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The Polish Bar Council reports national data only once in 3 years for the full intervals;
data for October 2004–June 2007 and October 2007–June 2010 were not gathered.
SOURCE: Polish Bar Council.

permitted cooperation with other lawyers and professionals, and other
related issues. Duties in professional ethics on their part, as mentioned
above, describe desired behavior of a lawyer (confidentiality, good
manners, honesty, loyalty), and thus can possibly impact clients more
directly than breaches in professional duties, which are meant to safeguard clients’ interests usually more indirectly. For this reason, fewer
allegations related to professional ethics than to professional duties is as
positive of a message as the declining rate of breaches in the latter. The
frequencies of other types of reported breaches in complaints, including
unjust financial settlements with clients (fees) or abuses in the freedom
of speech (insults or similar), remained stable at low levels or even
slightly declined.
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Figure 5.2 Complaints on Advocates by Type of Allegation
(per practicing advocate)
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Despite increased inflow of cases for investigation to the disciplinary prosecutors in the bar councils of advocates between 2004 and 2013,
the number of indictments remained relatively stable (Figure 5.1). It
may point to relatively little substance in the charges filed.
The relative number of penalties imposed on advocates changed
little over the 2001–2016 period (Figure 5.3). Their structure also
remained quite similar, although the least severe penalties (warnings
and reprimands) were imposed slightly more frequently. The harshest
penalty, loss of the right to practice, has been imposed in only about
100 cases. In absolute terms the number of warnings increased from
52 in 2001–2004 to 152 in 2013–2016 (threefold), that of reprimands
from 41 to 182 (more than fourfold), and the number of fines from
41 to 121 (threefold). However, given a threefold increase in the number of practicing advocates over that period (from 5,000 in 2001 to
16,000 in 2016), the frequency of penalties per practitioner remained at
a very low level (4.2 percent in 2013–2016 for all penalties combined).
These statistics are even lower if we consider only legally valid penalties (advocates may challenge the decisions of the first-instance disciplinary courts)—then the frequency of all penalties per practitioner in
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Figure 5.3 Penalties Imposed by the First-Instance Disciplinary Courts,
Both Legally Valid and Challenged (per practicing advocate)
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2013–2016 drops to 2.8 percent (their structure remains similar to that
observed for all the penalties).
Notwithstanding their relative minor importance, one can expect
that increases in the number of verdicts pointing to breaches in professional ethics—as well as in the number of issued warnings, reprimands,
and prohibitions to supervise a trainee—can also be attributable to the
more rigorous approach the disciplinary courts have adopted since
2013–2016 as compared to the previous periods.
Legal Advisors
The complaints against legal advisors are resolved by disciplinary
prosecutors in the district chambers of legal advisors. Their validity is
examined, and the prosecutor assigned to the case decides whether to
initiate an investigation, refuse to do so, pass the case to the dean of
chamber (in less severe instances) or to a different chamber, try to reach
an amicable settlement, or drop the case. Once the prosecutors decide to
investigate a case, they can also suspend it or quash an enquiry. Should
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they find enough evidence against a legal advisor, they file an indictment to a disciplinary court. Similarly, should the dean conclude that
a legal advisor committed wrongdoing, he or she can issue a warning.
A comparison of the numbers of incoming cases between advocates
(0.52 per practicing advocate in the period, mid-2013 to mid-2016) and
legal advisors (yearly inflow multiplied by three—0.15 for the threeyear period 2014–2016) shows that the frequency of misconduct claims
against legal advisors is much lower (Figure 5.4); one reason may be
their limited activity in litigation. Despite a short span of the time series,
it is noticeable that there has been a decline in the number of cases filed
to the chambers between 2010–2013 and 2013–2016 per practicing
legal advisor, which may stem from a better conduct of legal advisors.
Figure 5.4 Number of Cases to Investigate by the District Disciplinary
Prosecutors (per practicing legal advisor)
0.30

Inflow of cases to resolve
Total number of cases to examine
Refusals to initiate a disciplinary investigation
Initiatiations of disciplinary investigations
Indictments
Dean's warnings

0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00

2010–22013
2010013
(yearly average)

2013

2014

2015

2016

SOURCE: National Chamber of Legal Advisors.

Other indicators of the lack of professionalism, such as indictments and
warnings, did not exhibit any significant time trend.5
District disciplinary courts of legal advisors received 500–900 cases
yearly during the period 2010–2016 (Figure 5.5). The inflow remained
steady at the level of 2.2–3.3 percent relative to the population of active
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Figure 5.5 Inflow of Cases to District Disciplinary Courts of Legal
Advisors (per practicing legal advisor)
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legal advisors. Most of the inflow can be attributed to the appeals from
their refusals to file an indictment (1.2–1.6 percent).
Neither the dynamics of cases for investigation by the district disciplinary prosecutors in 2013–2016 nor the dynamics of cases registered
in the district disciplinary courts in 2010–2016 exhibit any upward or
downward trend. The share of acquittals and convictions in the rulings
of the district disciplinary courts between 2010 and 2016 remained relatively stable, suggesting no deterioration in service quality.
The analysis of time series for rulings of the Higher Disciplinary
Court of legal advisors in 2005–2016 allows for an identification of a
stable upward trend in the number of penalties issued during the period
2005–2010. However, because the effects of the reforms became more
apparent around 2011, the number of penalties has been fluctuating
since, not exhibiting any particular trend.
Overall, our results show that a rapid increase in the number of
legal professionals (that followed the deregulation) did not coincide
with an increased number of reported misconducts. A declining num-
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ber of complaints per practicing advocate, especially those originating
from courts, also marks a significant professional improvement that
accompanied the reforms. Performance of legal advisors matched that
of advocates. Only a very low number of complaints on advocates and
legal advisors led to subsequent charges and a conviction by a disciplinary court, a penalty, or a dean’s warning.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The Polish reforms present an interesting case study on reforming the entry criteria to the legal profession. Several waves of reforms
brought about complex changes in the regime of rules of entry that,
according to its proponents, aimed to strike the right balance between
the private interests of the profession and the common good (public
interest). Some of the changes included delicensing the legal counsel,
which is the most important part of legal services, while implementing
alternative and more transparent sets of requirements for aspiring lawyers. Maintaining a legal protection for their professional titles (advocate, legal advisor) reduced the need for delicensing some of the legal
professions, while easier access to these professions contributed to an
expansion in their availability. The data presented in this chapter do not
point to a deterioration in the quality of service provided, at least in the
sector served by the qualified lawyers. At the same time, they show an
increase in the availability of the service as evidenced by the significant
growth in the number of practitioners, a clear sign of the value added
to the market. Some of this growth can be attributed to the emergence
of a group of lawyers with lower levels of education (legal counselors),
which would coincide with evidence from the existing literature (Timmons and Thornton 2017, 2019).
The partial deregulation of the market for legal services that
occurred in Poland in 2004–2005 changed the institutional setting for
legal work, advancing the logic of the market while limiting some of
the most alarming examples of self-interested behavior of the bar associations. Leaving most of the rules of conduct unchanged and keeping
intact the power of the self-regulatory bar associations helped to maintain the standards of professionalism on the market as defined by the
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Polish Bar Council and the National Chamber of Legal Advisors. Also
potentially contributing to the outcome are the ties the qualified lawyers, authorized to stand before a court, have with the unregulated law
firms that guarantee the retention of the prereform licensing standards
for courtroom representation (where the possible negative externalities
of the low-quality legal services are likely to be the highest). It is worth
mentioning that following the reforms, the bar training improved and
the bars professionalized their operations (also because of more anonymous relationships among their members), communicating online and
providing more workshops and support for their members, among others. The reforms produced a higher demand for legal education before
the exams, which helped to create new preparatory courses, while the
officials from the Ministry and the bar associations became more skilled
in setting adequate requirements for the exams.
As Mayson (2020) put it, “No regulatory approach can ever be perfect nor can it eradicate all risks to the public” (p. ix). The burden and
cost of regulation should be proportionate to the risks involved. It seems
that, at least in Poland, there is still some room for improvement. Fair
competition may require, for instance, that all practitioners and other
providers of legal services are registered and, possibly, also subject
to disciplinary liability or ombudsman investigation (Mayson 2020).
At the same time, the requirements to obtain the professional title of
advocate or legal advisor and to practice in these professions could be
decreased or at least re-evaluated (Devlin 2017; Gordon, Shackel, and
Mark 2012; Semple 2013). In Britain, Mayson (2020) finds that competences and ethics of qualified lawyers are not necessarily better than that
of the unregulated lawyers. The rules of conduct relating to marketing
practices or office premises could be relaxed to allow more space for
competition that would help new entrants establish and expand their
law firms. Such a reform can be justified on the basis that the junior
lawyers are at an inherent disadvantage compared to their older peers
as they usually have to build their own client base, and some of the
standards imposed by the bar disproportionately constrain their entrepreneurial endeavors. This has become particularly apparent recently in
Poland in an increasingly saturated market for legal services.
The Polish case also demonstrates that education, training, and
assessment can be used as policy instruments to better meet consumers’ needs (Boud and Falchikov 2007). Instead of serving mainly law-
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yers’ needs, the exams were originally suited to meet the expectations
of candidates and those of the general public. Since the relative number
of disciplinary cases and complaints did not increase after 2009, when
an ever larger group of legal professionals originated from those who
joined the profession after the reforms, it is likely that the new requirements at the entry to the profession were adequately set without compromising professionalism. It is noteworthy that of the 39 jurisdictions
surveyed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018), 9 had professional examinations administered by the state
jointly with a professional body.
Since disciplinary actions are taken only in cases where no other
options remain and the functioning of legal professions rests predominantly on individual self-regulation, group identification, and peer pressure (Boon and Whyte 2019), it seems that additional changes, if any, in
regulation of the legal services market should focus on the importance
of acquiring ethical skills (professionalization).
Notes
1. Unfortunately, there are no data available on the pass rates at the professional
exams administered until 2009 by the bar associations (each of 19 district chambers of legal advisors and 24 district bar councils of advocates separately) to conduct comparisons with the chances of becoming a lawyer immediately after the
reform, 2005–2008.
2. See Białowolski and Masior for other approaches (2021).
3. To our knowledge, the National Chamber of Legal Advisors does not write or
publish such comprehensive reports. However, the yearly statistics we were interested in are gathered on a local level by the district bar chambers, so the National
Chamber of Legal Advisors gathered and aggregated them at our request. We are
thankful both to the Polish Bar Council and the National Chamber of Legal Advisors for their valuable input.
4. There are reasonable grounds to assume that the propensity to complain in the
Polish society did not change in the period under investigation (from 2000 to
2015). For example, the proportion of Poles who signed a petition in previous year
remained constant and stood at 7–9 percent (Czapiński and Panek 2015).
5. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain data for earlier periods.
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Restrictions on Health Care
Profession Scope of Practice
Do They Help or Harm Patients?
Kihwan Bae
Edward Timmons
West Virginia University,
Knee Center for the Study of Occupational Regulation

WHAT IS SCOPE OF PRACTICE?
Occupational licensing has grown significantly in the United States,
especially in the health care services and education industry. According
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2022), in 2021, more than 40 percent
of workers in that industry require a license. Occupational licensing is
intended to provide consumer protection from incompetent or unscrupulous purveyors of a service (Kleiner 2015). Although the traditional
arguments in support of occupational licensing are strongest in the
health care industry, it is less clear why the tasks of medical professionals should be rigidly defined and inflexible, particularly in a rapidly
changing environment. Medical service demand increases, technology
improves, and the market adapts and changes. It is not fully understood
whether limitations on the tasks performed by medical providers are
consistent with patients receiving the best quality of service.
Scope of practice (SOP) laws specify what kinds of tasks or functions can be legitimately performed by practitioners in a specific occupation. They determine the boundary of authority for occupations that
provide similar services, and frequently stipulate a supervisory or collaborative relationship between physicians and other medical practitioners. As a result, a strict SOP regulation may prevent medical practitioners from working to the full extent of their training and may lead
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to inefficient labor utilization and contribute to shortfalls in access to
care.1
In medicine, there are vast differences across states with respect to
what nurse practitioners and physician assistants are permitted to do
in various settings. Certified nurse midwives and certified registered
nurse anesthetists are also facing significant regulation that prevents
them from working to the full extent of their training. Patients seeking physical therapists may be forced to see a physician before or soon
after receiving treatment. Despite receiving more pharmacology training than most physicians, pharmacists are often limited in the provision
of medical services.2
We begin this chapter by documenting current issues in SOP regulations and how the regulations vary across states. We then summarize
evidence on the effects of liberalizing SOP regulations on health outcomes such as infant mortality, care quality, and emergency room visits.
Lastly, we present a roadmap for possible policy reform.

WHAT ARE THE RELEVANT ISSUES IN SOP BY
PROFESSION, AND HOW DO STATES DIFFER?
We examine SOP regulations on six medical professions: nurse
practitioners (NPs), physician assistants (PAs), certified nurse midwives (CNMs), certified registered nurse anesthetists, physical therapists (PTs), and pharmacists. With specialized education and training,
these medical practitioners may have the ability to perform some of
the tasks or functions that have been performed by physicians. Moreover, training these practitioners is less costly than training physicians
because their education requirements are lower. Therefore, granting
these practitioners the authority to practice to the full extent of their
training can increase access to medical services and reduce service
costs. This approach seems particularly relevant in a rapidly aging society with growing demands for medical services. However, SOP regulations often prohibit practitioners from independently providing medical
services, greatly limiting the ability of the providers to fill in gaps in
medical care.
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Scope of practice regulations are very complex. First, practitioners
in different professions have different specialties, so they naturally have
different SOP. Next, practitioners in each profession perform several
distinct functions that are regulated separately. Indeed, SOP regulations
frequently distinguish prescription authority from practice authority.
Moreover, the tasks that can be performed legitimately by a professional are regulated at the state level and differ widely across states.
Furthermore, for some practitioners, the functions that are permissible
are determined at the individual practice level. For some practitioners,
whether they can perform a specific function is contingent on functionspecific education or licensing requirements. These complexities present additional barriers to the efficient use of the medical workforce.
State regulation grants physicians broad authority to practice medicine based on their own judgment.3 But most other practitioners, such as
NPs and PAs, face limitations on which tasks they can perform without
involvement from a physician. Both of those professions appeared in
the 1960s in response to the excess demand for primary care physicians
in the United States (Timmons 2017). The number of NPs and PAs has
gradually increased and is now approaching the number of primary care
physicians (Stange 2014). Nurse practitioners are registered nurses who
completed specialized graduate education and a nationally administered
certification exam to treat common illnesses and prescribe medications.
Given their specialty in primary care, broadening their SOP and allowing them to work independently has been suggested as a way to improve
care access and reduce care costs (Adams and Markowitz 2018; Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2011). Currently, most
states recognize NPs as primary care providers, and several states authorize them to practice and prescribe independently from physicians. As a
result, NPs help fill gaps in service access in medically underserved areas
(Kurtzman et al. 2017). Nevertheless, SOP regulations in many states
still require NPs to practice or prescribe under the supervision of or in
cooperation with physicians.
Similar to NPs, PAs are equipped with practical knowledge on general medicine and clinical experience through graduate-level education
that may qualify them to provide primary care without physician supervision (Adams and Markowitz 2018; Kaiser Commission on Medicaid
and the Uninsured 2011). Interestingly, however, PA SOP is determined
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differently than NP SOP—PAs are permitted to perform any tasks delegated to them by physicians (Stange 2014). In other words, their SOP
is determined by physicians at the individual practice level (Scope of
Practice Policy 2020a). Accordingly, whether they can prescribe medications—and which types—is also determined at the practice level.
This regulatory structure clearly removes the possibility that a PA can
independently serve patients in medically underserved areas.
Like NPs, other advanced practice registered nurses also face SOP
regulations that limit their independent practice. Certified nurse midwives are registered nurses who completed specialized education and
a national certification exam on the birthing process and well-woman
gynecological care. Historically, midwifery was first licensed in Illinois in 1877, and many states adopted a similar regulation in the early
1900s (Anderson et al. 2020). Then, nurse-midwifery began in 1925
and evolved to CNMs through the 1960s (Dawley 2003). In 2018,
CNMs attended 9.4 percent of total births and 20.1 percent of births
from American Indians or Alaska Natives (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2019). They have independent practice and prescription authority in most states. However, some states require a collaborative practice agreement or supervision of physicians for the practice
of CNMs, and some explicitly require a written protocol on allowable
practices as a part of collaboration or supervision, thereby adding significant administrative burdens (Markowitz et al. 2017).
Certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) are registered
nurses who obtained specialized graduate-level training for administering anesthesia and overseeing patient recovery. Nurse anesthetists
have been providing patient care for more than 150 years, and CRNAs
came into existence in 1956 (American Association of Nurse Anesthetists 2020a). They are the primary provider of anesthesia in rural areas
(American Association of Nurse Anesthetists 2020b). Unlike advanced
practice registered nurses, CRNAs face a nationwide regulation that
significantly limits their SOP. Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement
rules specify that a surgeon or anesthesiologist oversee the provision
of anesthesia by CRNAs (Dulisse and Cromwell 2010). Since the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) allowed states to opt
out of the requirement in 2001, some states have expanded the SOP of
CRNAs; however, most states maintain the CMS requirement, which
effectively limits independent practice of CRNAs.
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Physical therapists are another profession where tasks are severely
limited by SOP regulations. PTs specialize in examining and treating
human bodies with physical means and are required to obtain a doctorate degree of physical therapy. The field of physical therapy was established around 1916 with the polio epidemic and World War I (Timmons,
Hockenberry, and Durrance 2016). The role of PTs has been limited by
physicians for many years by a requirement that patients get a physician’s referral before obtaining physical therapy care. Since Nebraska
granted direct access authority to PTs in 1957, a growing number of
states allow patients to visit PTs without a referral (Timmons, Hockenberry, and Durrance 2016). Despite this trend, most states limit direct
access to PTs by stipulating maximum treatment periods before a physician visit is required.4
Pharmacists have long been forbidden to prescribe drugs without a
physician’s order. Given their training in pharmacology and medicine,
they have the proper knowledge and skills to prescribe some types of
drugs and to provide additional medical service independently from
physicians. In this vein, some states allow pharmacists to modify medication regimens from the original prescription either independently or
in cooperation with the original prescriber, and some states allow pharmacists to provide hormonal contraceptives (Rodriguez et al. 2020) or
smoking cessation aids (Adams and Hudmon 2018). All states allow
pharmacists to provide vaccination service to adults (McConeghy and
Wing 2016). In 2017, Idaho passed legislation granting pharmacists the
broadest SOP in the nation—allowing pharmacists the authority to prescribe medication in several specific instances (Broughel, Haunschild,
and Yatsyshina 2020). Most states still limit the role of pharmacists
within the physician’s prescription order, and many states also impose
patient-age limitations on child vaccinations.
Comparison across States by Professions
We now turn to our comparisons of SOP regulations in each state.
Because of the previously noted complexities in SOP regulations, there
may be alternative measurements on the restrictiveness of a state’s SOP
regulations. We use publicly available information on SOP regulations
that is compiled by professional associations, which closely tracks SOP
for the purpose of advocacy and to keep individual members informed
of new developments.
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Figure 6.1 provides an overview of NP SOP as of June 2021.
Twenty-three states and D.C. allow NPs to practice to the full extent of
their training.5 Most of these states grant independent practice authority
and independent prescription authority together. In contrast, 27 states
still limit the ability of NPs to practice independently from physicians.
Among them, 16 states with reduced SOP require a career-long collaborative agreement with physicians, and 11 states with restricted
SOP require career-long supervision, delegation, or team management
by physicians. In addition, 39 states explicitly recognize NPs as primary care providers, while 11 states and D.C. do not (Scope of Practice
Policy 2020b). Considering that NPs are certified based on a national
standardized education and exam, the substantial variations in NP SOP
across states cannot be justified based on differences in skills or human
capital across states.
Unlike NP SOP, PA SOP is determined mostly by physicians. Figure 6.2 illustrates differences in PA SOP as of September 2020. In 37
states and D.C., supervising physicians or clinical teams set the procedures PAs are allowed to perform at the practice level. In the remaining 13 states, SOP is regulated by the state medical board or state laws
Figure 6.1 Scope of Practice for Nurse Practitioners
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Reduced practice
Restricted practice

SOURCE: American Association of Nurse Practitioners (2021).
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Figure 6.2 Scope of Practice for Physician Assistants
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SOURCE: Scope of Practice Policy (2020a).

(Scope of Practice Policy 2020a). Similarly, PA prescription authority
is usually determined at the practice level. In addition, several states
do not allow PAs to prescribe certain types of controlled substances.
It is interesting to note that NPs and PAs may perform similar tasks in
clinical teams. SOP determined at the practice level purportedly gives
more flexibility to clinical teams than SOP laws (American Association
of Physician Assistants 2019). Increased flexibility, however, does not
necessarily mean that PAs are allowed to perform to the full extent of
their training.
As shown in Figure 6.3, CNMs have independent practice and
prescription authority in 27 states and D.C. However, 19 other states
require CNMs to perform under a collaborative practice agreement with
physicians. A subset of these states requires a collaborative practice
agreement for prescription authority only, while other states require an
agreement for both practice and prescription. Moreover, the remaining
4 states require direct physician supervision of CNMs, which significantly limits the ability of CNMs to provide care and fill in gaps in care
in medically underserved populations.
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Figure 6.3 Scope of Practice for Certified Nurse Midwives
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SOURCE: American College of Nurse-Midwives (2018).

Figure 6.4 shows that CRNAs may be able to provide anesthesia
independently from physicians in 18 states, all of which opted out of
the physician supervision requirement for the CMS. Colorado is in
a partial opt-out status, permitting CRNAs to administer anesthesia
independently in critical access hospitals and certain rural hospitals.
In the remaining 31 states and D.C., CRNAs still need the supervision
of a surgeon or anesthesiologist to get Medicaid reimbursements for
their practices. This restriction clearly limits CRNA independence and
limits their potential to improve access to anesthesia services in rural
communities.
Figure 6.5 shows how states compare with respect to patient direct
access to physical therapy services. PTs are allowed to treat patients
without any limitations and physician referral in 20 states with unrestricted direct access. Twenty-seven states and D.C. require a referral
for a certain treatment or limit patients’ access time and frequency to
PT services. In Alabama, Missouri, and Mississippi, PTs can meet and
treat patients after a previous diagnosis or referral by physicians only,
or direct access may be permitted only when treating certain patient
populations.
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Figure 6.4 Scope of Practice for Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists
(Physician Supervision Requirement for CMS Reimbursement)

Legend
Full opt-out
Partial opt-out
No opt-out

NOTE: Opt-out means CRNAs can obtain CMS reimbursements for their independent
practices without physician oversight.
SOURCE: American Association of Nurse Anesthetists (2020b).

Figure 6.5 Direct Access for Physical Therapists

Legend
Unrestricted
direct access
Direct access
with provisions
Limited direct
access

SOURCE: American Physical Therapy Association (2020).

106 Bae and Timmons

As noted in the previous section, the SOP of pharmacists is quite
complex and involves several distinct functions, such as prescription
adaptation, vaccination, hormonal contraceptives, and smoking cessation aids. In Figure 6.6, we focus on limitations on pharmacists administering child vaccinations. Twenty-seven states allow pharmacists to
provide a vaccination to all children; 20 states and D.C. prohibit pharmacists from administering vaccinations to children under a certain
age. Connecticut, Florida, and Vermont do not allow pharmacists to
vaccinate children. With respect to other medical services, pharmacists
may prescribe smoking cessation aids in 12 states and hormonal contraceptives in 9 states and D.C. Idaho, Indiana, and Maine allow pharmacists to modify medications independently or in cooperation with the
original prescriber (Scope of Practice Policy 2020c).
Figure 6.6 Limitations on Pharmacists to Administer Child Vaccination

Legend
Allowed with
no age limit
Allowed with
age limit
Not allowed

SOURCE: American Pharmacists Association (2019).

Exploring Trends in SOP
In the preceding sections we highlight differences across states with
respect to SOP. Are there any common trends? For a systematic correlation analysis, we focus on the full practice authority of the following
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four occupations: full practice of NPs (Figure 6.1), independent practice of CNMs (Figure 6.3), CMS opt-out for CRNAs (Figure 6.4), and
unlimited direct access of PTs (Figure 6.5). As summarized in Figure
6.7, 47 percent of all 50 states plus D.C. grant NPs full practice authority, 55 percent CNMs, 35 percent CRNAs, and 39 percent PTs.
Figure 6.7 Full Practice Authority

Percentage of states with full practice

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

NP

CNM

Occupation

CRNA

PT

SOURCE: Authors’ calculation based on data from American Association of Nurse
Practitioners (2021), American College of Nurse-Midwives (2018), American Association of Nurse Anesthetists (2020b), American Physical Therapy Association (2020).

Our first finding is that states granting full practice authority to an
occupation tend to give it to other occupations. Table 6.1 shows that the
full practice authority of NPs, CNMs, CRNAs, and PTs is positively
correlated with each other. NP and CNM full practice authority have
the highest correlation (0.776) and is statistically significant at the 0.1
percent level. PT full practice authority also has a strong positive correlation with NP and CNM full practice authority.
Turning our attention to geography, we find that there are clear
geographic differences in full practice authority: states in the western
region are the most likely to grant full practice authority to the four
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Table 6.1 Correlation in Full Practice Authority between Professions
NP
CNM
CRNA
PT
NP
1.000
0.776***
0.372**
0.530***
CNM
0.776***
1.000
0.175
0.486***
CRNA
0.372**
0.175
1.000
0.247*
PT
0.530***
0.486***
0.247*
1.000
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant at
the 0.001 level. Pearson correlation coefficients.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from American Association of Nurse
Practitioners (2021), American College of Nurse-Midwives (2018), American Association of Nurse Anesthetists (2020b), American Physical Therapy Association (2020).

occupations, while states in the southern region are the least likely (Figure 6.8). Interestingly, the northeast region generally grants full practice
to NPs and CNMs but is more restrictive for CRNAs and PTs.
Figure 6.8 Full Practice Authority by Census Regions
100%
Fraction ofofstates
Percentage
stateswith
withfull
fullpractice
practice

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Midwest

Northeast

South

Nurse practitioner

Certified nurse midwives

Certified registered nurse anesthetists

Physical therapists

West

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from American Association of Nurse
Practitioners (2021), American College of Nurse-Midwives (2018), American Association of Nurse Anesthetists (2020b), American Physical Therapy Association (2020).
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Table 6.2 takes a closer look at geographic concentration of full
practice authority at the census division level. Interesting regional differences emerge from this comparison. For example, in the Midwest
region, the majority of states in the west north central division allow
full practice to all four occupations, whereas very few states in the east
north central division grant the same freedom to practice. In the northeast region, all states in the New England division allow NP full practice, but none in the middle Atlantic division grant this permission. It
is also worth noting that not a single state in the east and west south
central divisions in the southern region authorize NPs and CNMs to
practice to the full extent of their training.
In summary, we provide empirical evidence on the correlation and
diffusion of SOP expansion across occupations and states and observe
that the similarity between occupations and geographic proximity
Table 6.2 Full Practice Authority by Census Divisions
Region
Division (member states)
NP
CNM CRNA PT
Midwest East north central (IL, IN, MI,
0.0
20.0
20.0
0.0
OH, WI)
West north central (IA, KS,
71.4
57.1
85.7 57.1
MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)
Northeast Middle Atlantic (NJ, NY, PA)
0.0
66.7
0.0
0.0
New England (CT, ME, MA, 100.0 100.0
16.7 33.3
NH, RI, VT)
South
East south central (AL, KY,
0.0
0.0
25.0 25.0
MS, TN)
South Atlantic (DE, DC, FL,
22.2
33.3
0.0 33.3
GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)
West south central (AR, LA,
0.0
0.0
25.0
0.0
OK, TX)
West
Mountain (AZ, CO, ID, MT,
87.5 100.0
50.0 87.5
NV, NM, UT, WY)
Pacific (AK, CA, HI, OR, WA) 80.0
80.0
80.0 60.0
NOTE: Percentage of states with full practice authority for NMs, CNMs, CRNAs, and
PTs by census divisions.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on data from American Association of Nurse
Practitioners (2021), American College of Nurse-Midwives (2018), American Association of Nurse Anesthetists (2020b), American Physical Therapy Association (2020).
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between states play an important role in SOP reforms. This pattern
implies that the state-level regulatory environment or geography that is
independent from occupation-specific factors may be key for determining SOP. If SOP is indeed heavily affected by political factors rather
than practitioner training and competency, it is more likely that the
regulation may not benefit patients but just strengthen special interests
(Friedman 1962). To further explore this hypothesis, in the next section
we summarize the existing empirical evidence of the effects of SOP differences on quality.

WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE?
As our summary of the literature will show, there is accumulating
evidence that restricted SOP does not improve the quality of medical
service, but instead limits access to medical services. In fact, some
studies demonstrate that the relaxation of SOP regulations results in
improved health outcomes. These findings are consistent across studies
with a variety of health outcomes such as self-reported health, regular
checkups, office visits, hospitalizations, mortality, infant health, and
birth outcomes. The findings are also robust to alternative measurements for SOP. Given the complexities in SOP regulations, studies tend
to focus on whether a state allows fully independent practice and prescription authority without any physician involvement. Other studies
focus exclusively on independent prescription authority instead, while
other studies use indexes that measure overall restrictiveness of SOP
regulations. Furthermore, studies using policy variations across states
and those using within-state variations over time reach a similar conclusion—granting independent practice authority to health care service
providers does not reduce the quality of care.
As shown in Table 6.3, the largest number of existing studies on
SOP and service quality focus on NPs. Traczynski and Udalova (2018)
find that NP independent practice improves self-reported health status
and raises the frequency of routine checkups. The authors also find evidence that NP independence reduces indirect costs relating to appointments or travel and increases patient-reported care quality. They classify a state’s NP practice environment as independent if the state permits

Table 6.3 SOP Expansion and Health Outcomes
Study
Traczynski and Udalova
(2018)

Profession SOP measure
NPs
Both practice and
prescription authority

Effects on health outcomes
NP independence increases the frequency of routine checkups and the
fraction of people whose self-reported health status is excellent.

Alexander and Schnell
(2019)

NPs

Prescription authority

NP independent prescription reduces the number of days in poor
mental health (self-reported) and mental health-related mortality rates.

Kleiner et al. (2016)

NPs

Prescription authority

NP restricted prescription does not improve infant mortality rates but
increases service prices of well-child visits.

Kurtzman et al. (2017)

NPs

Practice and prescription NP independence does not reduce service quality such as depression
authority
treatment but increases service utilization such as counseling and
medication.

Perloff et al. (2017)

NPs

Practice and prescription NP restricted practice or prescription does not improve quality
authority
of primary care such as chronic disease management and cancer
screening.

Markowitz et al. (2017)

CNMs

Practice and prescription CNM independence does not change maternal and infant health
authority
comes but raises CNM-attended births and lowers labor inductions
and C-sections.

Yang, Attanasio, and
Kozhimannil (2016)

CNMs

Practice authority

CNM independence increases CNM-attended births and reduces
C-sections, preterm births, and low-weight births.

Dulisse and Cromwell
(2010)

CRNAs

CMS physician supervision requirement

CRNA independence does not increase surgical inpatient mortality
rates and complication rates from anesthesia.
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both independent practice and prescriptive authority. They study the
effects of policy changes in NP independence in eight states. Their sample is individuals in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Adult SelfAdministered Questionnaire data from 1999–2012.
In a similarly designed study, Alexander and Schnell (2019) find that
NP independent prescription authority improves self-reported mental
health outcomes. Moreover, they find that the benefits from independent
NPs are concentrated in medically underserved areas. In these underserved areas, NP independent prescriptive authority reduces mental
health–related mortality rates as well as increases self-reported mental
health. They measure NP independent prescription authority from 1990
to 2014 based on the NP’s legislative updates, correspondence with state
nursing boards, and state statutes. Their study examines the effects of
policy changes in prescription authority in 18 states. They use countyquarter-level mortality data from the U.S. mortality files to measure
mental health–related mortality rates and data from the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System to measure self-reported mental health.
Exploring the effect of NP prescriptive authority on a variety of
outcomes, Kleiner et al. (2016) find that restricted NP autonomy does
not improve infant mortality rates but raises service prices. The authors
classify NP prescription autonomy into three categories: independent,
supervised or delegated, and limited. They look into the effects of state
policy changes with five-year county-level infant mortality rates data in
1999–2004 and individual insurance claims data in 2005–2010.
Two other studies that focus on health outcomes for medically underserved communities or populations are also worth noting. Kurtzman
et al. (2017) have shown that NP full independence does not reduce
quality of care relating to smoking cessation, depression treatment, and
statin prescriptions at community health centers. Their study defines
whether NPs have full independence with respect to practice and prescriptive privilege based on the ratings provided in Nurse Practitioner magazine. The authors compare health outcomes between states
with full independence and those without. Their sample is the National
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey Community Health Center subsample in 2006–2011.
Similarly, Perloff et al. (2017) document that restrictive NP SOP
does not improve quality of primary care relating to chronic diseases,
preventable hospitalizations, adverse outcomes, and cancer screening
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of Medicare beneficiaries. The authors separate states into three categories of NP independence: full, reduced, and restricted authority. They
compare health outcomes in the three groups of states. Their sample
consists of aged and disabled beneficiaries in Medicare claims data in
2012–2013.
Several studies have examined the effects of CNM SOP on maternal
and infant health outcomes. Markowitz et al. (2017) show that CNM
SOP does not affect maternal health behaviors during pregnancy. The
authors also find that states with less restrictive CNM SOP regulations
have fewer induced labors and C-sections, slightly longer gestation
ages, and larger newborn weights than states with more restrictive SOP
regulations. Based on the Nurse Practitioner’s legislative updates and
state statutes, they categorize SOP barriers in practice and prescription
authority into four different levels: none, low, moderate, and high. They
examine the effects of state policy changes with birth certificate data
from the Centers for Disease Control’s National Vital Statistics System
for 1994–2013.
Yang, Attanasio, and Kozhimannil (2016) find similar results using
the National Center for Health Statistics Natality Detail File data for
2009–2011. Their study shows that autonomous CNM practice reduces
the likelihood of C-section, preterm birth, and low-weight birth. They
distinguish states with autonomous midwifery practice from those subject to supervisory or collaborative agreement, based on LexisNexis
legal research, and compare the outcomes between the two groups.
Another noteworthy study examines how removing physician supervision requirements affects quality of care provided by CRNAs. Dulisse
and Cromwell (2010) find that states allowing CRNAs to administer
anesthesia independently did not experience an increase in mortality or
complication rates. The authors study the effects of policy changes in
14 states immediately after the CMS allowed states to opt out of physician supervision requirements in 2001. They use the 5 percent Medicare
Inpatient (Part A) and Carrier (Part B) Medicare limited data set files
for 1999–2005.
To summarize the existing literature, studies on SOP changes and
the implications for the quality of care concentrate on advanced practice registered nurses, including NPs, CNMs, and CRNAs. The current
focus on advanced practice registered nurses may be a direct result of
the important roles they can play as primary care providers in many
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states amid the ongoing shortage of physicians. In contrast, it is largely
an unexplored topic of how SOP regulations in other professions affect
service quality in the United States. A handful of studies focusing on
European countries have documented that patients obtaining PT services without physician referral have higher satisfaction and better discharge outcomes than patients referred by physicians (Holdsworth and
Webster 2004; Ojha, Snyder, and Davenport 2014; Webster et al. 2008).
In addition to research that estimates how SOP affects health outcomes, several studies have also examined how differences in regulation affect the utilization or costs of medical services. This strand of the
existing literature does not look directly into care quality, but it is very
likely that improvements in access and reductions in prices will be correlated with improved health outcomes. Studies focusing on NPs have
shown that their full independence increases office visits (Stange 2014),
the provision of counseling and medication in community health centers (Kurtzman et al. 2017), and medication prescriptions in retail clinics (Spetz et al. 2013) and also decreases hospitalization rates (Oliver et
al. 2014) and the price of well-child visits (Kleiner et al. 2016). Turning
to CNMs, studies have found that more consumers choose CNM delivery when their practice becomes more autonomous (Markowitz et al.
2017; Yang, Attanasio, and Kozhimannil 2016). Studies on PAs have
documented mixed results as to whether their independent prescription
authority reduces office visits (Stange 2014) and lowers the cost of outpatient claims per Medicaid beneficiary (Timmons 2017). Regarding
pharmacists, studies have shown that allowing influenza vaccinations in
community pharmacies increases per-capita influenza vaccine pharmacy
prescriptions (e.g., McConeghy and Wing 2016), and pharmacists tend
to prescribe hormonal contraceptives over longer time intervals than
clinicians (Rodriguez et al. 2020). Taken together, fully granting independent authority to medical providers tends to increase care utilization
and reduce service prices, and this likely also improves patient health
outcomes. Our survey of the literature suggests that expanding medical
provider SOP improves the quality of care delivered to patients. Nonetheless, we observe several possibilities for improving research on SOP
and service quality. First, there is still disagreement on the classification
of SOP regulation used by researchers. It is uncertain which aspect of
NP SOP is most crucial: independent practice authority or independent
prescription authority.6 Moreover, differences in state regulations make
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it hard to devise a single objective measurement of SOP. In addition,
studies on SOP and service quality have used health outcomes, an arguably indirect measurement of service quality. Studies with more direct
measurements of quality, such as a procedural outcome or malpractice
premiums, may be able to fill the research gap. Finally, as noted in
our review, there are many professions where the connection between
medical SOP and quality remains largely unexplored. Perhaps as more
time passes and more data become available, future research can help
fill in these existing gaps in the literature.

COVID-19 WAIVERS AND A ROADMAP FOR REFORM
Our summary of the existing literature on how the expansion of
SOP affects the quality of care yields the following stylized fact: granting health care providers—most notably advanced practice registered
nurses—the ability to work independently has no measurable negative
affect on health outcomes. If there is an effect on quality, the effect
seems to be more positive than negative. The policy implications are
quite clear. States that currently limit providers from practicing to the
full extent of their medical training—which tend to be concentrated in
the South— should remove these stringent regulations.
The onset of COVID-19 has highlighted some of the existing limitations in the provision of health care. Hospitals in early hotspots like
New York City and New Orleans struggled to provide care to patients as
a result of rigidity in health care personnel supply. New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo made a public plea for doctors and nurses to come to
New York City and help fill in gaps in the provision of care (CBS News
2020). Early in the crisis, the ability of NPs to fulfill their potential was
no doubt limited by existing New York law. Although experienced NPs
(with 3,600 hours or more of clinical practice) can work independently
of physicians, more inexperienced NPs must work collaboratively with
physicians (Poghosyan, Norful, and Laugesen 2018)
Recognizing the need for added flexibility, Governor Cuomo issued
an executive order on March 23, 2020, granting NPs the authority to
practice independently (New York State 2020). Similar temporary
waivers were also granted to PAs and CRNAs. Several other states tem-
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porarily expanded medical provider SOP to add frontline capacity for
treating COVID-19 patients and to also make sure that patients suffering from other ailments and diseases had access to care (Bayne, Norris,
and Timmons 2020).
Moreover, the federal government declared emergency rules shortly
after the pandemic began to expand the SOP of medical practitioners. On
March 17, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services issued
an amendment to override state restrictions on pharmacist-administered
vaccination on children over age three (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services 2020). The CMS temporarily suspended physician
supervision requirements for CRNAs on March 30. The agency also
relaxed rules on physician delegation to and supervision of NPs and
PAs in critical access hospitals, federally qualified health centers, and
long-term care facilities (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
2020).
In a crisis, state governors and legislators and federal agencies
responded quickly and often granted medical providers more independence and broader SOP. As more data become available, it will be interesting to uncover the effects that these temporary waivers had on the
quality of care delivered. An early comparison of Ohio and Illinois, two
states that did not expand NP SOP, with surrounding Midwest states
that granted waivers suggests that COVID-19 deaths were reduced by
10 cases per day in the states that granted temporary waivers (Chung
2020).
Will state policymakers and federal agencies eliminate the temporary waivers after the COVID-19 pandemic ends? Or will there be a
recognition that perhaps the restrictions were never in the patients’ best
interest? Perhaps a renewed push to expand SOP for medical personnel
will begin in earnest in coming years. The crisis has created an interesting opportunity for researchers and policymakers alike.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we examined how the SOP of health service professionals varies across states. We surveyed the existing literature on the
effects of expanding SOP on the quality of care received by patients.
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There are noticeable variations in the SOP of the same occupation
across states, but positive correlations in the SOP expansion across different occupations in the same state. States in Pacific, Mountain, and
West North Central divisions are ahead of other states in granting the
full practice authority to health service professionals, while states in the
South are way behind. Much of the literature on the SOP and the quality of care focuses on advanced practice registered nurses: NPs, CNMs,
and CRNAs. Although the literature has some limitations, there is an
emerging consensus: allowing medical practitioners to work independently from physicians does not reduce the quality of care but rather
appears to improve the quality of care with no measurable influence on
prices. Despite this, regulatory reforms on the SOP are often crippled
by professionals who may benefit from existing regulations.
More research is needed on this important empirical question, particularly when it comes to PT direct access and expanding the SOP of
pharmacists. The COVID-19 pandemic has provided both researchers
and policymakers with an opportunity to further investigate the implications of this important health policy question.
Notes
1. Kleiner (2016) provides a survey of literature on how SOP affects wages and
employment of various health care occupations. Adams and Markowitz (2018)
survey literature on how SOP of advanced practice registered nurses and physician
assistants affects employment, service price, quality, and utilization. Two recent
papers examine the effects of licensing on service quality: Farronato et al. (2020)
show that licensing of home repair contractors does not improve the service quality measured by consumer satisfaction, while Anderson et al. (2020) demonstrate
that midwife licensing reduced maternal and infant mortality between 1900 and
1940. Our focus in this chapter is specifically how SOP of medical providers
affects health outcome as a measure of medical service quality.
2. Similar issues exist in the practice of dentistry, with dental hygienists and dental assistants serving a regimented and subordinate role (Chen, Meyerhoefer, and
Timmons 2020). As of July 2019, only 13 states permit dental therapists to practice either statewide or within tribal lands although they are much more prevalent
outside of the United States (American Dental Hygienists’ Association 2019).
3. To receive authorization to perform surgery, physicians must obtain the relevant
American Board of Medical Specialties certification and obtain operating room
privileges from the hospital treating the patient.
4. There are at least two occupations whose tasks overlap those of physical thera-

118 Bae and Timmons
pists or physicians: occupational therapists and chiropractors. This book chapter does not deal with issues in these occupations. See Cai and Kleiner (2020)
for occupational therapists and Timmons, Hockenberry, and Durrance (2016) for
chiropractors.
5. Delaware became the twenty-fourth state to recognize the full practice authority in
August 2021 (Campaign for Action 2021).
6. See McMichael and Markowitz (2020) for a recent attempt toward a uniform classification of NP SOP.
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Testing Licensing and
Consumer Satisfaction for Beauty
Services in the United States
Darwyyn Deyo
San José State University

Occupational licensing varies widely in the United States, with
some occupations heavily licensed in one state and not licensed at all
in others. The barriers to labor market entry created by licensing are
often defended on the grounds of protecting public health and safety.
However, because licensing is required for a multitude of occupations,
it becomes more difficult to determine whether licensing achieves its
intended objectives. Public health and safety also may be framed as
quality, where licensing requirements protect consumers from dishonest or unqualified businesses. Consumer satisfaction, as measured
through consumer ratings, provides a window into understanding the
link between licensing and quality. This chapter examines licensing and
quality for occupations in the beauty services industry using publicly
available ratings data in the United States.
This chapter adds to the literature by examining licensing’s effect
on quality in two occupations related to beauty services: makeup artists and shampooers. Importantly, these occupations are not licensed in
every state. This policy variation means we can study the effect of having more or fewer licensing requirements, such as the amount of licensing fees or licensing exams, and the effect of having licensing at all.
Studying the depth of licensing is helpful when considering the effect of
increasing (or decreasing) specific requirements, whereas studying the
breadth of licensing is helpful when considering the effect of passing
(or repealing) different licensing requirements.
To study the effect of licensing, I compare the ratings of businesses
in licensed occupations (makeup artists and shampooers) with the
ratings for an interesting but comparable unlicensed occupation (pet
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groomers). Pet groomers also shampoo, cut, style, and alter their clients’ appearance. Pet groomers may work with dogs, cats, other household pets, and even larger animals. Importantly, the pet has a proxy for
reporting quality in the form of the person who paid for the pet grooming. Pet grooming certification is available in most states, but the occupation is not licensed in any of the states in this study. I use the publicly
available business ratings from the Yelp Open Dataset and the License
to Work licensing dataset (Carpenter et al. 2017) to estimate the effect
of licensing on quality across these occupations.

BACKGROUND
Approximately one-fifth of the U.S. workforce now requires a
license or certificate to work in their occupation, compared with 5
percent in the 1950s (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). Data from the 2019
U.S. Current Population Survey estimates that nearly 22 percent of all
employed workers need a license, and nearly 23 percent of workers in
the “Other services” category, which includes personal beauty services,
require a license. Licensing is often associated with higher consumer
prices, a fall in the labor supply, and higher profits for licensed providers (Dorsey 1983; Hogan 1983; Kleiner 2000; White House 2015).
Licensing also generates rents, which are earnings and revenue
above the competitive market level, for workers in those occupations.
Cosmetology licensing generates annual rents of about $1.7 billion
(Adams, Jackson, and Ekelund 2002), while barber licensing increases
barber earnings between 11 and 22 percent (Timmons and Thornton
2010). Licensing also can have a strong effect on immigrant communities. For example, higher licensing for manicurists reduced the number of Vietnamese manicurists by nearly 18 percent and led to community dispersion during the end of the twentieth century (Federman,
Harrington, and Krynski 2006).
Legislatures and courts cite quality and consumer safety rationales
when passing and upholding occupational licensing, as in Meadows v.
Odom (2003) and Vong v. Sansom (2009) (Theiss 2011). Research on
the impact of licensing on quality remains an important field of study.
Licensing could potentially lower quality as suppliers face less compe-
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tition, especially if consumers face asymmetric information or if reputational effects are weak (Leland 1979). The benefits of higher licensing
also may generate higher prices for consumers and greater returns to
the licensed workers as competition is restricted (Pagliero 2011). These
restrictions may come at the cost of pricing other consumers out of the
market (Carroll and Gaston 1983; Shapiro 1986). A major barrier to
empirical research testing the link between licensing and quality has
been the lack of available quality metrics across the more than 800
occupations licensed in at least one state (Kleiner and Krueger 2013).
There is some empirical evidence on the link between licensing
and quality. Dentistry historically is a licensed profession, but more
stringent licensing requirements were not found to improve dental outcomes, as evaluated with statutory data on licensing from 1960 to 1994
(Kleiner and Kudrle 2000). Recent evidence from online platforms
shows that more stringent licensing does not improve quality for residential home services, as measured by consumer ratings, but that it does
reduce competition and increase prices (Farronato et al. 2020). Licensing also may not affect quality in the same way across income groups.
Child care licensing reduced the number of providers in low-income
neighborhoods, estimated with data from 1987 to 2000, while increasing the quality of providers in high-income neighborhoods (Hotz and
Xiao 2011), which represents a welfare transfer from low-income to
high-income neighborhoods. Floral licensing, with florists rating floral arrangements, also did not significantly affect product quality in a
2010 test (Carpenter 2011, 2012). Similarly, I find that higher licensing
requirements generally do not have a positive association with higher
ratings. Higher licensing fees are negatively associated with ratings,
with statistically significant results. The association between ratings
and higher requirements for more education and experience is negative and statistically significant, but not economically large. Requiring
more licensing exams is statistically significant for some subsamples;
the association is negative for makeup artist licensing but positive for
shampooer licensing. I also find that the breadth of licensing generally has significant negative effects on ratings, ranging from the economically small to changes in whole ratings for a business. I find that
makeup artist licensing has a positive effect on quality for businesses
with the largest number of reviews, but shampooer licensing has a negative trend for all businesses.
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USING THE RATINGS AND LICENSING DATASETS
Using the Yelp Open Dataset
The challenge to estimating quality for beauty services first arises
from the availability of data on service quality. Unlike in education
(teachers) and health care (doctors), there are few ways to check the
quality in beauty service industries. This study employs the publicly
available business ratings data from the Yelp Open Dataset to estimate
the effects of licensing on quality, using business ratings as a measure
of quality via customer satisfaction.
Publicly available Yelp business ratings have been used in studies
on reputation, business responsiveness, and even hospital care. They
have also been used to improve hospital care as a supplement to traditional patient surveys (Bardach et al. 2013; Ranard et al. 2016), as well
as to evaluate the impact of local economic policy (Glaeser, Kim, and
Luca 2017) and gentrification (Glaeser, Kim, and Luca 2018). Business
ratings can signal expected quality to consumers and signal information about the quality of their competitors to firms (Luca 2016). Yelp
ratings have also been found to accurately measure quality as estimated
by other sources (Luca 2016). The social networks of Yelp users have
been used to estimate the effect of in-network recommendations, with
social network friends being 67 percent more likely to visit the same
restaurant within a year (Teng 2019).
There is also evidence that businesses change their behavior in
response to public ratings, suggesting that firms believe consumers rely
on ratings (Gergaud, Storchmann, and Verardi 2015; Luca 2016). Yelp
prohibits businesses from paying for reviews or removing reviews.
However, businesses offering customers incentives in exchange for
good reviews could potentially influence their rating, so I test the sensitivity of the results by restricting businesses by their number of reviews.
It is important to account for how many reviews a business has because
the number of reviews in the sample varies considerably. For example,
some businesses have as few as 3 reviews and some have over 600. The
average rating for a business with only 10 reviews would be more influenced by the removal of a particular review, or the presence of a single
one-star or five-star review, than the average rating for a business with
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600 reviews. The number of reviews by quartile groups for the analysis
samples is also discussed later in the chapter.
Organizing the Ratings Data
The ratings data were downloaded in February 2020 and exported
from Python to a CSV file. Stata 16 was used for all data analysis. The
original dataset includes 209,379 unique businesses with information
on the business ID, name, location, average rating, number of reviews,
whether or not the business is open, and the industries in which it operates. There is one observation and rating for each business. Average
ratings are coded on a scale of one to five stars with half-star points.
Ratings cannot be broken down over time, although the number of
reviews captures information about how established the business is,
for example, by age or reputation. The data include businesses with at
least 3 reviews. Location data include the business’ address, city, state,
postal code, and latitude and longitude. The industry data include a list
of industries for the business; for example, a barbershop may be crosslisted under both hair salons and men’s hair salons.
To identify the businesses that face licensing requirements for
makeup artists or shampooers, as well as businesses that offer pet
grooming, I identified businesses using the industry string variable.
Makeup artists may work independently or in salons, and the industry
variable includes a separate identification for makeup artists. I did not
include permanent makeup services, which is a separate service. Shampooers work in salons. To minimize potential errors from businesses
that primarily provide hair styling, I restricted the sample for shampooer
licensing to businesses listed under hair salons. Pet groomers may work
in a variety of pet-service-related businesses, but the industry variable
includes a separate identification for pet groomers.1
In addition, I rescaled the five-star average rating variable to a ninepoint ordinal scale for regression analysis, i.e., one star is equal to one
on the ordinal scale, but one-and-a-half stars is equal to two on the ordinal scale, two stars is equal to three on the ordinal scale, etc.

128 Deyo

OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING DATA
There is often frequent overlap in the services provided in beauty
salons, all of which may face licensing requirements. For example, a
beauty salon may employ a cosmetologist, an esthetician, a makeup
artist, a shampooer, a waxing specialist, and an eyebrow threader.
Workers in each of these specialized occupations can face licensing
requirements, although some statutes are now being struck down on
a state-by-state basis (Sibilla 2020). In other cases, states are trying to
expand requirements (Herbert 2018; Ziv 2020). Although barbers and
cosmetologists are universally licensed in the United States, makeup
artists are licensed in 41 states and shampooers are licensed in 37 states
(Carpenter et al. 2017). According the 2017 U.S. Census, there are an
estimated 78,887 beauty salon establishments in the United States, with
$22.6 billion in revenue and 432,037 employees.
This study uses state occupational licensing requirements from the
License to Work dataset (Carpenter et al. 2017). The dataset includes
licensing requirements for five categories across all 50 states and D.C.
for 102 commonly licensed occupations. The five categories in the
dataset are licensing fees, requirements for education and experience
in days, the number of state-required licensing exams (both practical
and written), the minimum school grade, and the minimum age requirement. I focus on the first three categories in this study, as minimum
school grade and age requirements most often correlate with high
school graduation and the age of majority. I also use the log licensing
fees for the analysis.
Makeup artists apply cosmetics to the face or other exposed body
areas in order to alter an individual’s appearance; they are licensed in
41 states. The occupation is ranked as having the fifty-eighth most burdensome licensing requirements and as being the twenty-eighth most
widely and onerously licensed occupation (Carpenter et al. 2017). Louisiana and Nevada specifically license makeup artists—the other 39 states
license makeup application under the scope of licenses administered by
cosmetology boards (Carpenter et al. 2017). On average, makeup artist
licensing requires $169 in fees, 134 days of education and experience,
and successful completion of two licensing exams. Wisconsin requires
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the most licensing fees in this sample, at $391, and Illinois requires the
most days of education and experience, with 175 days.
Shampooers shampoo and rinse customers’ hair and are licensed in
37 states. The occupation is ranked as having the forty-fifth most burdensome requirements and as being the thirty-second most widely and
onerously licensed occupation. Of the 37 states that license shampooers,
Alabama, Louisiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia specifically license shampooers. The other 30
states license shampooing under the scope of licenses administered by
barbering and cosmetology boards (Carpenter et al. 2017). On average,
shampooer licensing requires $130 in licensing fees, 248 days of education and experience, and successful completion of two licensing exams.
Wisconsin requires the most licensing fees in this sample at $391, and
Ohio requires the most days of education and experience with 280 days.

MERGING THE DATASETS
I first restricted the ratings data to observations that included all
variables used in this analysis. I then identified the county for each business using the latitude and longitude variables and the 2019 TIGER
county shapefiles and merged in the estimated 2019 county population
data, all from the U.S. Census Bureau. State identifiers from the Census
Bureau were then used to merge the consumer ratings data with the
Carpenter et al. (2017) licensing requirements data. Separate files were
created for the makeup artist and shampooer samples. In the second
part of the analysis, which includes a modified difference-in-difference
regression approach, I included pet groomers as an unlicensed comparison occupation for both makeup artists and shampooers. The final panel
dataset of all three occupations included 7,224 businesses in eight states
(Arizona, Illinois, North Carolina, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Wisconsin).2
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METHODOLOGY
Identifying Treatment and Comparison States
After the sample of ratings and licensing requirements were merged,
I identified the states that require any licensing for makeup artists and
the states that require any licensing for shampooers. Figure 7.1 shows
Figure 7.1 States by Sample and Licensing
Makeup artists

Shampooers
Shampooers

Not in
Not sample
in Sample
In Sample,not
Not Licensed
In sample,
licensed
In Sample,licensed
Licensed
In sample,

NOTE: There are 1,430 observations in states which require licensing for makeup artists and 574 observations in states which do not. There are 2,117 observations in states
which require shampooer licensing and 4,197 observations in states which do not.
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the state licensing maps for makeup artists and shampooers. The eight
states in the sample are located across the four U.S. Census Regions.
There is one state in Census Division 2 – Middle Atlantic (Pennsylvania); three states in Census Division 3 – East North Central (Illinois,
Ohio, and Wisconsin); two states in Census Division 5 – South Atlantic
(North Carolina and South Carolina); and two states in Census Division
8 – Mountain (Arizona and Nevada). Although the original dataset does
not include all 50 states, and states are further restricted to businesses
in the study occupations, the final dataset still includes a dispersion of
states across the country.
Identifying the Distribution of Ratings by the Number of Reviews
The ratings data also report the number of reviews for each business. As the number of reviews may capture unobserved information
about a business, such as the size of the customer base and whether
the business is new, I restrict samples of businesses by the number of
their reviews. I first compared the results of using all businesses to the
results of those with at least 10 reviews, and then at least 30 reviews.3 I
also split the businesses into quartile groups with both lower and upper
bounds based on the number of reviews. This method organizes businesses into similar groups by the number of their reviews, relative to
everyone else in the sample.

THE EFFECT OF THE DEPTH OF LICENSING
AND RATINGS
I first use a linear regression to estimate the relationship between
ratings and the depth of licensing requirements. I only consider makeup
artists and shampooers in this analysis and analyze each occupation
separately. I estimate the relationship between the outcome of the scaled
rating and the independent variables of logged licensing fees, education and experience requirements in days, and the number of licensing exams.4 Figure 7.2 reports the results for the relationship between
licensing requirements and ratings. Smaller confidence interval bands
around the coefficient estimate represent higher degrees of statistical
significance.
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Figure 7.2 Estimates for the Level of Licensing on Ratings
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NOTE: Estimates were calculated using basic linear regression with standard errors
clustered by county.
SOURCE: Data are publicly available business ratings from the Yelp Open Dataset and
the 2017 License to Work dataset.

Requiring more licensing does not have a positive significant association with higher business ratings for makeup artists. When the sample is restricted to businesses with at least 30 reviews, there is a significant negative association for higher logged licensing fees of (−0.43 ±
0.02) and for more licensing exams (−0.33 ± 0.02). The estimates for
education and experience were positive and significant but not economically different from zero. This suggests that licensing imposes costs
on makeup artists and their customers without increasing quality. For
example, increasing licensing fees by 5 percent would be associated
with about a whole star reduction in a business rating, such as from
three stars to two stars.5
The estimates for the association between ratings and shampooer
licensing indicate a significant negative association between higher
logged licensing fees for all three samples, with estimates between
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−0.23 (±0.04) and −0.43 (±0.03). In contrast, there is a positive significant association for licensing exams for all three samples, with estimates from 1.3 (±0.17) and 1.89 (±0.10). The estimates for education
and experience were negative and significant but not economically different from zero. In this case, the costs from licensing are partially offset by the quality gains from licensing exams, although there are still
quality losses from higher licensing fees.

THE EFFECT OF ANY LICENSING ON RATINGS
Next I estimate the relationship between ratings and the presence of
licensing requirements. I estimate the effects of licensing by comparing
the ratings for makeup artists (both licensed and unlicensed) and shampooers (both licensed and unlicensed) with the ratings for pet groomers,
who face no licensing requirements in the sample. I identify whether
businesses are in states that require licensing for their occupation and
estimate the effect of licensing on ratings using these characteristics.6
Figure 7.3 reports the effect of licensing on quality, presented by the
minimum number of reviews for businesses. The effect of licensing on
ratings for makeup artists is negative for the sample with all businesses
and those with at least 10 reviews, at which point it becomes significant
(−0.19 ± 0.04). In contrast, the effect of licensing on ratings for businesses with at least 30 reviews is positive (0.12 ± 0.04). However, both
of these effects are economically small, such that requiring any licensing affects the rating by less than a full point on the ordinal scale. The
effect of licensing on ratings for shampooers is similarly small, negative, and not significant across all three samples. At best, this suggests
that licensing has no general positive effect on quality.
Figure 7.4 reports another test on the effect of licensing on quality,
presented by quartile groups for the number of reviews for businesses.7
I include results for the full sample as before, as well as the results of a
restricted sample. The full sample for makeup artists includes the following number of reviews by group: Group I (3–5 reviews); Group II
(6–11); Group III (12–28); and Group IV (29–646). The full sample
for shampooers includes the following number of reviews by group:
Group I (3–5 reviews); Group II (6–9); Group III (10–23); and Group
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Figure 7.3 The Effect of Licensing on Ratings, by Number of Reviews
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NOTE: Estimates were calculated on the scaled rating using a difference-in-differences
linear regression with standard errors clustered by county.
SOURCE: Data are publicly available business ratings from the Yelp Open Dataset and
the 2017 License to Work dataset.

IV (24–649). The restricted sample for makeup artists includes the following number of reviews by group: Group I (3–6 reviews); Group
II (7–15); Group III (16–43); and Group IV (44–646). The restricted
sample for shampooers includes the following number of reviews by
group: Group I (3–5 reviews); Group II (6–10); Group III (11–26); and
Group IV (27–649).
Of the 41 states that license makeup artists, Nevada grants a specific
license for the occupation, and of the 37 states that license shampooers,
Nevada and South Carolina similarly grant a specific license (Carpenter
et al. 2017).8 Because the cross-licensing from cosmetology may affect
the results, I tested the findings by restricting the samples to states that
either did not license the occupation and those that specifically grant a
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Figure 7.4 The Effect of Licensing on Ratings, by Review Quartile Group

Shampooers [restricted sample]

Group II
Group IV

NOTE: Groups I to IV represent the quartile groups by the number of reviews for businesses. The restricted sample drops states which license makeup artists or shampooers under cosmetology from the treatment group. Estimates were calculated on the
scaled rating using a difference-in-differences linear regression with standard errors
clustered by county.
SOURCE: Data are publicly available business ratings from the Yelp Open Dataset and
the 2017 License to Work dataset.

license to the occupation. Pet groomers are still used as the comparison
occupation. The results are similar to the previous tests of the effect of
licensing on quality, with significant positive effects for makeup artists
with few (Group I) and many (Group IV) reviews and negative effects
for those in the midrange (Groups II and III). The results for shampooers follow the same trend as in the full sample; however, the results are
statistically significant for Groups I, II, and IV.
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DISCUSSION
I find that licensing requirements, either by depth or breadth, do not
significantly increase quality through the ratings measure of consumer
satisfaction. I do find evidence that licensing sometimes has a negative
effect on quality—this result is clearer when businesses are separated by
the number of reviews. At best, licensing does not seem to measurably
increase quality across the board or for all businesses, even within the
same occupation. At worst, licensing barriers reduce quality while also
imposing entry barriers for workers and higher costs for consumers.
The number of reviews for a business can significantly affect its average rating, especially when comparing businesses with very few reviews
to those with many. Therefore, the number of reviews serves as a useful
way to differentiate and group businesses by review size. This study
finds that licensing increases quality for makeup artists with very few
or very many reviews. The results for shampooer licensing also follow
a negative trend across the distribution, which is even more interesting
when considering that shampooers are often licensed with cosmetologists, who are universally licensed. Considered together, licensing may
be reducing average quality for the average licensed business.
However, not all types of licensing requirements had the same
effect. Licensing exams may verify that applicants actually meet a quality threshold, whereas licensing fees would instead impose a financial
threshold. Education and experience surprisingly seem to have no economically significant effect on quality, because although the results are
statistically significant, the magnitude effect on ratings is indistinguishable from zero. Despite makeup artists and shampooers having to complete hundreds of days of education and experience, it has not led to
measurably higher quality. Pet groomers, after all, similarly stand on
their feet much of the day and shampoo and style their client’s appearance. If licensing requirements for human beauty services are not leading to higher-quality services than those of unlicensed pet beauty services, it is perhaps worth evaluating the costs of licensing against its
promised benefits.
Ultimately, the major finding is that licensing does not seem to
reliably increase quality, as measured by consumer ratings. This result
may not be surprising, given that many businesses are grandfathered
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into new licensing requirements (Han and Kleiner 2021), which raises
further questions about the efficacy of licensing in raising quality or
protecting public health and safety. However, the results for beauty service occupations are new, and given the prevalence of beauty service
licensing requirements, relevant to policy reform. Further research on
this subject is warranted as more data on changes in licensing over time
becomes available.
There are some limitations to this study. Businesses were matched
as closely as possible with occupational licensing requirements, but
given cross-licensing within beauty service occupations, the estimates
in this study may underestimate the effects of licensing on quality. The
study also cannot control for unobservable changes over time, either
from changes in a business’ rating over time or changes in licensing
requirements. I also cannot tell if there are unlicensed businesses in my
sample that are evading licensing requirements in their state. However,
there are strong incentives for producers outside the legal market to
avoid publicity. Also, there is no way to determine if businesses select
on licensing requirements in a state based on the quality of service they
intend to produce. Some of these challenges are common to licensing
studies and studies that use the Yelp Open Dataset.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR LICENSING REFORM
In spring of 2020, as states began shutting down social and economic activity in an effort to curb the spread of COVID-19, they
also began waiving requirements and expanding scope of practice for
healthcare workers (Timmons, Bayne, and Norris 2020). Proponents of
licensing argue that the regulation protects the public health and safety,
and yet during a pandemic, states prioritized fast-tracking and waiving licensure requirements, expanding scope of practice, and recognizing out-of-state licenses for health care services. Regulatory reforms to
other sectors also emerged, such as allowing customers to order alcohol
with their food delivery, as states recognized businesses were struggling to stay open (Gonzalez 2018). At the same time, many beauty
salons, including hair salons and nail salons, waited months longer to
reopen (Sandler 2020).
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Licensing reform for beauty services is not a minor undertaking
or one without high stakes for practitioners. In 2020, New York State
legislators advanced a bill that would mandate a new shampoo assistant
certificate. Prospective shampooers would have to complete a minimum
of 500 hours of the required 1,000 hours in a licensed school, pay a fee,
and would be subject to a civil penalty of $500 for the first violation and
$1,000 for subsequent violations (Ziv 2020). The bill also includes the
fiscal impact and notes that the licensing requirement would generate
revenue for the state in the form of licensing fees and civil penalties,
which may raise questions about the motivation behind such requirements. State regulatory agencies are being presented with new opportunities to reform occupational licensing and increase access to labor
markets, which many states did for health care workers early on in the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Instead of increasing licensing requirements, states could recognize
licenses that were granted by other states. States could also engage in
licensing reciprocity agreements, which allows for mutual recognition of licenses from other states. These reforms could facilitate labor
mobility and encourage new business at a time when such opportunities
are desperately needed. State policy reform could also address the stringency of the occupational licensing requirements for beauty services,
including makeup artists and shampooers. States could delicense the
occupation or relax the requirements. Forty-one states license makeup
artists and 37 states license shampooers, including those that license
the occupations as part of cosmetology. The extent of beauty service
licensing across states also represents the potential for large gains from
policy reform in the way of increased access to labor markets without
sacrificing consumer quality.
Conventional wisdom holds that occupational licensing protects
public health and safety and thus raises quality. However, research has
indicated small to neutral effects of licensing on quality, and in other
cases, distributional effects between low- and high-income groups
(Anderson et al. 2020). The analysis here suggests that licensing can,
in contrast to expectations, lower quality, especially as measured by
consumer satisfaction via ratings. State policy reform that reduces
licensing barriers does not have to come at the cost of lower quality for
consumers. Reforming licensing requirements could encourage greater
labor mobility and economic opportunity for workers while also maintaining—or even improving—the quality of services for consumers.
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Notes
1. I dropped Yelp pet groomer businesses cross-listed under “Veterinarians,” as veterinarians are licensed separately. I also dropped observations that had potential
mistakes in the list of the businesses’ industries, such as “Entertainment” or “Jewelry.” These cross-listings may occur because businesses are located in shopping
centers or are otherwise cross-listed.
2. The original Yelp Open Dataset sample included 27 states. I restricted the sample
to states that had at least 30 observations and included observations for both the
licensed and unlicensed occupations.
3. Kernel density estimates for ratings were calculated using the Epanechnikov kernel function.
4. In the scaled rating, a rating of 5 stars is equal to 9 points, a rating of 4.5 stars
is equal to 8 points, etc. I control for the county population and cluster standard
errors by county. Estimates are reported at the 95 percent confidence level.
5. This model assumes a linear monotonic relationship between ratings and licensing. There may be diminishing marginal returns to level changes in licensing
requirements that are not tested here.
6. I control for the county population and cluster standard errors by county. Estimates are reported at the 95 percent confidence level.
7. The model follows the same format as in the previous set of regressions.
8. Additional states grant specific licenses but are not in the sample.
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Concluding Thoughts and
Policy Recommendations
Maria Koumenta
Queen Mary, University of London and
Knee Center for the Study of Occupational Regulation

The key public policy justification for occupational licensing is its
presumed ability to protect the general public from incompetent and
unscrupulous practitioners. Consumers often lack the knowledge to
assess the quality of a product or service prior to purchasing it, particularly if it is technical or requires specialist knowledge or skills. By
setting minimum qualification requirements for entry to occupations,
occupational licensing is expected to raise average skills and competence levels in the occupation, since low-quality providers will likely
be unable to meet the new qualification requirements and therefore
driven out of the occupation (Pagliero 2013; Rostam-Afschar 2014).
Taken together, entry regulations are expected to ensure that consumers receive a more homogeneous and high-quality product, while the
resulting higher investments in training have the potential to enhance
the skills base in the labor market. If this is the case, then the welldocumented negative labor market effects of occupational licensing
need to be weighed against the potentially positive service quality and
efficiency effects it yields in their markets and by extension to the wider
economy.
There is little known about the empirical relationship between
regulation of occupations and quality of services. This book makes
an important contribution to knowledge of the quality and efficiency
effects of regulation. We study six markets (ridesharing, driving instruction, pharmacies, beauty services, legal services, and health care) in
four European countries (Poland, Italy, Ireland, and the United Kingdom) and the United States, as well as exploiting specific features in
each regulated market using novel approaches.
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GREASE OR GRIT?
How does occupational regulation affect quality? Here we present
a summary of the results; see Table 8.1. We find no evidence that more
stringent licensing for ridesharing drivers has an effect on customer
satisfaction ratings or measures of hard braking and accelerations. An
increase in regulations pushed many driving instructors out of the market and increased prices but did not improve the quality of instructors or
success rates for learner drivers. In the pharmacy market, the availability of pharmacies seems to be correlated with a decrease in the number
of hospital admissions related to influenza, suggesting a possible link
to the accessibility of the services offered by pharmacists and consumer
health. With legal services, there was little change in the overall quality
of legal services following Polish relaxation of entry requirements as
measured by complaints and disciplinary cases, and the availability of
practitioners in the market increased. We find considerable variation in
how rigidly defined and inflexible the scope of practice is among medical practitioners across different U.S. states, while a systematic review
of the empirical literature shows that allowing medical practitioners the
ability to work independently from physicians does not reduce the quality of care. Finally, in beauty services, licensing requirements either by
depth or breadth do not significantly increase quality as measured by
consumer satisfaction ratings.
Taken together, these case studies indicate that an increase in the
availability of service providers or competition does not have negative
effects on the quality of the services provided or survey measures of
consumer satisfaction. To the contrary, in a number of cases we find
positive effects of increased availability and competition. Our overarching conclusion is that licensing regulations in the occupational markets
we studied serve more as grit than grease in driving efficiency and quality. This contrasts with the strong opposition that policymakers typically
face from professional associations and licensing boards when trying to
implement reforms. Such opposition perhaps is motivated more by the
professionals’ interests than by the interests of consumers, which are
seldom arranged into influential and organized advocacy groups.
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Table 8.1 Summary of Findings
Occupation
and country
Ridesharing drivers
(London and
Dublin)

Nature of
regulatory reform
Explore variations
in the stringency
of the regulatory
regime between the
two jurisdictions

Driving instructors
(U.K.)

Increase in
educational
requirements to
practice

Pharmacists
(Italy)

Advocates and
legal advisors
(Poland)

Health service
practitioners
(U.S.)

Quality indicator
Customer
satisfaction ratings

Summary of findings
No effects

Hard braking and
hard accelerations
Service availability No effect on the
indicators
quality of instructors
Indicators
of student
performance

Negative effect on
outcomes for learner
drivers

Price levels

Higher prices

Relaxation of
quantitative
and structural
restrictions

Availability of
pharmacies at the
municipality level

Positive effect
on pharmacy
availability and
health indicators

Relaxation of
restrictions relating
to educational
requirements to
practice

Complaints and
disciplinary cases

Relaxation on
restrictions on the
scope to practice

Health outcomes
Positive effect on
(e.g., mental health, health outcomes
child mortality,
No effect on prices
patient mortality
rates)

Health indicators

Employment
creation

Decrease in
complaints and
disciplinary cases
against practitioners
Positive effect
on availability of
practitioners

Price levels
Makeup artists
and shampooers
(U.S.)

State variation
in licensing
requirements

Satisfaction ratings No effect of
by consumers
licensing on service
quality
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DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
Nevertheless, while the debate continues among those who support
regulation and those who argue for less, there is little acknowledgment
of several fundamental questions that are central to these discussions:
What are the underlying rationales for regulating occupations? Are current regulatory arrangements still serving effectively? How are advances
in knowledge and technology changing markets and the availability of
information, and thus the relationship between consumers and producers? What implications do regulations have for the current legal framework? Still, our work does not provide the last word on these issues.
Although we offer a series of examples on how to approach the issue of
measuring quality and how to use existing data to investigate the impact
of regulation on quality. As with any empirical work, it is difficult to
extrapolate from a sample or case, and more work is certainly needed
on the consumer benefits and costs of occupational licensing.
How do you measure quality? Our work clearly shows that not only
is it difficult to calculate, but even the very definition of quality varies
greatly across and within markets. The quality of some services can be
verified before purchase, while for other services verification comes
during or after provisions of the service. For some services, quality can
be verified only if additional costs are incurred, or not at all. Complaints
and disciplinary cases for legal professionals; product availability and
health outcomes for pharmacists; service availability and pass rates
for driving instructors; infant mortality, care quality, and emergency
room visits for health professionals; customer satisfaction surveys for
beauty professionals; and hard accelerations and braking for ridesharing drivers as proxies for safety—these are all examples of the different meanings that the idea of quality might take in different service
markets. Moreover, in most markets, quality is multidimensional, and
even a longer list of measures might not capture the full experience of
a customer. Still, we take on the challenge and try to measure quality
using the available information. While admittedly imperfect, the long
list of measures used throughout the book provides a variety of sources
of information on quality upon which others can build..
To estimate the impact of regulation on quality, one needs not only
measures of quality, but also variability in the intensity of regulation.
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Our case studies focus on a number of reforms, but also exploit variability across different jurisdictions. An important lesson from our work
is that there is more than one way to approach this empirical question.
A strength of the empirical work presented in this volume is the use of
a rich variety of data sources which came in the form of individual data
from service satisfaction surveys (lawyers/beauticians), administrative
data (pharmacists/legal professionals/health professionals), labor force
survey data (driving instructors), and even big data from a giant in the
gig economy (ridesharing drivers).
Since the main obstacle to studying the relationship between regulation and quality is a lack of data, there could be significant benefits
from more systematic data collection. Surveys, for example, can serve
as a useful tool to collect records on consumer satisfaction in a variety
of service markets. The survey approach has the advantage of providing
comparable data across nations and over time but has the disadvantage
of capturing subjective evaluations. More objective quality measures
are generally occupation- and country-specific. These could be systematically collected with the collaboration of the professional associations or regulatory agencies in each jurisdiction. Regulatory agencies should always attempt to evaluate regulatory changes that could
affect service quality, as well as prices and employment. Anticipating
the need to evaluate policy changes, forward-looking regulatory agencies could then start collecting the appropriate data before the reform.
More generally, they could implement it in such a way that evaluation
ex post becomes easier. Finally, consumer associations could play an
active role in monitoring the quality of services in many markets. They
are in a unique and privileged position to collect information on quality
of services, as they have a direct link with the final users.

DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY
A common theme that emerged from the six case studies is that
increasing the stringency of regulation is not necessarily associated
with better quality outcomes for consumers. Removing licensing
requirements or moving to a lighter touch could be a suitable policy
lever for certain occupational groups. However, policy reform does not
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necessarily have to come in the form of delicensing. For example, we
know from historical and institutional analyses of licensing that barriers to entry tend to be imposed cumulatively over time on occupations. Such barriers can progressively mount up to represent significant
hurdles to entry: unnecessarily lengthy training, limits on the number of
professionals that are allowed to operate in the market, restrictions on
corporate forms that businesses can take, restrictions on joint exercise
of professions, and scope of practice among occupations. Reexamining
the depth and the breadth of licensing arrangements on an occupationby-occupation basis could be a fruitful way to detect either redundant
or excessive constraints that have become institutionalized. Indeed, as
some of the authors in this volume point out, the COVID-19 pandemic
made salient some of the inefficiencies of licensing regimes and how
these in turn compromise quality and availability. Policymakers could
seize this opportunity to reevaluate the extent to which this labor market
institution influences the economy, and how it has evolved to serve its
intended purposes for consumers.
Proponents of regulation argue that in markets where consumers
cannot observe the quality of professionals, the imposition of a minimum quality standard through licensing will address the market failure
resulting from asymmetric information. The underlying assumption is
that asymmetric information is relevant and that professional regulation
serves the public interest. This certainly is a powerful argument, albeit
one that—as we have shown in this book—must be balanced against
the fact that these regulations may raise prices for consumers and compromise service availability. A fruitful line of enquiry that regulators
can pursue is whether there are alternative ways that the problem of
asymmetric information can be addressed. Information technology, for
example, has improved consumers’ access to information about the
quality of practitioners themselves (e.g., online reviews in digital platforms). Similarly, in some markets the availability of technical information can make consumers more knowledgeable about the services
they receive, thus enabling them to better assess its quality. Overall, the
availability of quality checks reduces the level of regulatory stringency
needed to ensure the same service quality as in a world where the option
to access this information was unavailable. Harnessing such alternatives is a fruitful path for policymakers to take.
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